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ABSTRACT:
The concept of tax sheltering is becoming increasingly attractive to clients, ambiguous to
tax practitioners, and detrimental to the United States taxation system, which creates urgency for
taxpayers, practitioners, and governmental officials to become educated on the industry's latest,
most complex, and controversial generation of tax products. Thus, the purpose of this research is
to provide a summarization of the abusive sheltering environment, its products, and players,
during the past ten years. While maintaining a focus on the most crucial level of tax sheltering,
taxpayers with $10 million plus in tax liability, this thesis establishes a background of the
sheltering industry, outlines potentially abusive components of high profile shelters, discusses
the outcome of abusive sheltering from both government and practitioner points of view,. and
lastly reviews relevant ethical concerns of the issue. The research methodology is qualitative in
nature and obtains the most relevant information, which is typically found in governmental
reports and congressional testimony, to form a concise industry report. Research has concluded
that a handful of CPA's among the most prominent accounting firms in the world were
previously involved with creating, soliciting, and implementing abusive tax shelters.
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Executive Summary
Traditionally the profession of public accounting has been held in the highest regard to
ethical and professional standards. Given the type of work that these professionals accomplish,
the intangible trait of integrity is as equally important as the technical skills they posses. Public
accountants are charged with the responsibility to assure stakeholders of the well being of their
respective companies as well as assisting taxpayers in self-assessment. However, the late 1990's
and early 2000's experienced a slight breach in the long-standing record of impeccable service
provided by the industry.
At around 1996, a majority of the Big-Fourl accounting firms and many other smaller
firms increased involvement in providing tremendously complex tax shelters to high profile
clients. While providing sheltering advice is not necessarily illegal, the economic environment
at the time acted as a major catalyst to facilitate the progression of the tax sheltering industry.
The late 1990's experienced outstanding economical growth, particularly the technology
industry, and as a result many American citizens found themselves with rather enormous tax
burdens at the year's end.2 What began as a legitimate attempt on the part of tax practitioners to
advise their clients on strategies to manage their newfound tax burden, in some instances, rapidly
spiraled out of control into a web of carefully engineered investment transactions designed only
to limit a client's tax burden.
The purpose of this research is to re-create the environment between 1996 and 2003 to
explore abusive tax sheltering through an example involving the Big-Four accounting firm of
KPMG, LLP. Although, it is important to note that while the names of-many accounting firms
may surface in the abusive tax sheltering debate, almost every case of illegal tax sheltering stems
from and only involves a handful of practitioners from their respective firms. The ambiguous
nature of tax law led to a heated debate over the legality of certain tax shelters, that even today in
the wake of numerous governmental investigations, are not proven illegal. Instead, the
overriding factor in determining the abusiveness of a shelter lies in the intent, on the part of the
taxpayer, to turn a profit from the complex investment transactions advised by one's tax
accountant. Typically non-abusive tax shelters are based on investments that have legitimate
potential to earn a return for the taxpayer. On the other hand, potentially abusive and abusive tax
shelters are based on investments that have little chance of earning a return for the taxpayer and
instead are forecasted to only create tax benefits.3
As such, the intent to abuse a tax shelter is displayed in many forms. Often taxpayers
were instructed to withdraw from long-term investment plans in a matter of 45 to 67 days.4 The

t Accounting firms classified as Big-Four fmns are the four biggest accounting fmns worldwide. They each create
roughly $16 billion a year in revenue and operate in approximately 140 different countries with over 100,000
employees. The fmns ofKPMG LLP, PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, Deloitte & Touche LLP, and Ernst & Young
LLP comprise the Big-Four.
2 Steve Blanc, CPA & J.D., interview by author, DeKalb, IL, September 22,2006
3 United States of America v. Stein, Lanning, Smith, Eischeid, Wiesner, Larson, Pfaff, Makov, Delap, Gremminger,
Ruble, Ritchie, Bickham, Watson, Warley, Rivkin, Hasting, Rosenthal, Greenberg, Sl 05 Cr. 888 (LAK).
4

Ibid.
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rate of early withdrawal clearly establishes a lack of economic intent on behalf of the taxpayer,
and when traced to specific tax products, proves that they are abusive in nature.
Next, in order for the sheltering transactions to operate as intended, both the accountants
and lawyers involved with the product had to issue opinion letters stating the legitimacy of their
tax advice. However, the letters issued for the abusive shelters were ultimately useless due to
their homogenous nature. In many cases a template was used to create letters for many different
clients who all had differing tax circumstances.5 Also characteristic of abusive sheltering is the
use of sham loans. In many cases these loans were issued by an investment bank that was
recruited by the lead accounting firm. Typically one component of the tax shelter involved the
taxpayer taking out a loan to fund the various investment transactions. But, in many cases the
taxpayer never had access to the funds loaned to him or her rather the loan transactions took
place on paper, thus preventing the investment banks from assuming risk.6 Further, abusive tax
shelters often created a lack of independence between the issuing accounting firm's audit
function and the shelter organizer's choice of investment banks. In the case of the KPMG
scandal, the involved tax practitioners recruited investment banks that were SEC audit clients of
KPMG.7 For the sake of external auditing, this effectively made irrelevant any claim of
independence between the banks and KPMG. Finally, issuing firms of abusive shelters went
through. great lengths to conceal and deceive governmental reviewers. As no coincidence, the
complexity of high profile tax shelters was over the heads of IRS auditors. In addition, many tax
shelter implementers priced engagements based on the risk of detection by the IRS. Other than
the technical nature ofthe shelters, practitioners also used concealment methods in preparation of
their clients' tax forms.s
The abusive sheltering services provided by select KPMG tax partners were chosen for
this illustration because they presented the most well known and clearly outlined instance of such
activity among the Big-Four accounting firms. After IRS and Tax Court scrutiny, KPMG finally
settled with the Department of Justice in order to avoid criminal prosecution. The firm was
assessed a $456 million dollar fine and was ordered to dissolve key functional groups responsible
for the creation, implementation, and marketing of high profile tax shelters. In addition, the
Department of Justice ordered that an independent monitor oversee the firm's progress towards
reform.9 In part because the Department of Justice made an example out of KPMG, the
remaining accounting firms that were involved in the same type of activity quickly followed suit
in reorganizing their functional groups.

5 United States of America v. Stein, Lanning, Smith, Eischeid, Wiesner, Larson, Pfaff, Makov, Delap, Gremminger,
Ruble, Ritchie, Bickham, Watson, Warley, Rivkin, Hasting, Rosenthal, Greenberg, SI 05 Cr. 888 (LAK).
6 U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations; Statement of Mark T. Watson, testimony of Mark T. Watson, KPMG Washington National Tax
November 18, 2003, http://hsgac.senate.gov/_files/111803watson.pdf, accessed September 2006.
7 United States of America v. Stein, Lanning, Smith, Eischeid, Wiesner, Larson, Pfaff, Makov, Delap, Gremminger,
Ruble, Ritchie, Bickham, Watson, Warley, Rivkin, Hasting, Rosenthal, Greenberg, SI 05 Cr. 888 (LAK).
8 Ibid.
9 "KPMG to Pay $456 Million for Criminal Violations in Relation to Largest-Ever Tax Shelter Fraud Case,"
Department of Justice press release (www.USDOJ.GOV, August 29,2005). From Department of Justice web site,
http://www.usdoj.gov/opalpr/2005/Augustl05_ag_ 433.html, accessed September 2006.
11

The initial reaction of the IRS to the discovery of abusive tax sheltering was that of "good
cop v. bad cop" on the part of Mark Everson, IRS Commissioner. He claimed that the IRS and
Department of Justice were prepared to pursue, to the highest degree, those still involved with
abusive sheltering,IO while at the same time offering a11grace
period for
taxpayers
to fix
In addition,
Everson
claimed
thattheir
the
taxes if they had been involved with an abusive shelter.
IRS is prepared to review potentially abusive shelters with the taxpayer in order to facilitate
compliance.

12

Nevertheless, Congress created The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-357),
which created specific laws against necessary components of abusive tax sheltering and also
widened pre-existing laws.13 Other than creating punitive incentives to deter participation in
sheltering, this report discusses various recommendations from expert witnesses to the
Congressional hearing. An interesting recommendation involves publicizing a practitioner's
law.I4 This recommendation makes use of the profession's
failure in compliance with sheltering
reliance on reputation as an incentive that is economically efficient; there would be no penalties
on behalf of the practitioner and minimal involvement of governing bodies.
The final portion of the paper divulges into ethics. It is important to understand why the
participation in such tax sheltering was unethical. The AICPAI5 Code of Professional Conduct
specifically bans the use of contingency fees under these circumstances and finds the relationship
between tax practitioner and investment banker (Sec audit client) to lack independence.I6 Also,
Circular 230, released by the Department of Treasury, is directed towards tax practitioners who
practice under the IRS and establishes laws based on ethical conduct. Circular 230 recently
underwent a revision to strengthen potential weaknesses related to sheltering.17 Lastly, Open
Compliance & Ethics Group deserves an introduction as one of the premier agencies whose
primary goal is to strengthen company awareness and resistance to ethical and fraudulent
breaches. The primary tool aiding the achievement of this goal is an ethical framework, which is
10"Justice Department Notes Increase in Tax Enforcement," Department of Justice press release (www.USDOlgov,
http://www.usdoj.gov/tax/txdv05167.htm. accessed
October 17, 2005). From Department of Justice web site,
September 2006.
\1 U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations; Statement of The Honorable Mark W. Everson, testimony of The Honorable Mark W. Everson,
Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service, November 20, 2003,
133&WitnessID=492, accessed
http://hsgac.senate.gov/index.cfm?FUSeaction=Hearings.Testimony&HearingID=
September 2006.
12Internal Revenue Service, "EP Abusive Transactions - Listed Transactions," Internal Revenue Service web site,
http://www.irs.gov/retirementiarticle/0,,id=119551,00.html, accessed September 2006.
13Internal Revenue Service, "New Tax Law Provisions Enacted to Combat Abusive Tax Shelters," Internal Revenue
http://www.irs.gov/businesses/article/0..id=149707.00.html. accessed September 2006.
Service web site,
14U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations; Statement of the California Franchise Tax Board, testimony of Debra Petersen, Tax Council IV,
_files/II1803petersen.pdf, accessed September 2006.
November 18, 2003, http://hsgac.senate.gov/
15The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants is the largest professional accountancy organization in the
U.S. and plays a major role in overseeing professional conduct.
16The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, AICPA web site, http://www.aicpa.org/, accessed
October 2006.
17Internal Revenue Service, "IRS and the Treasury Department Amend Circular 230 to Promote Ethical Practice by
http://www.irs.gov/irs/article/0,,id=132445,00.html,
Tax Professionals," Internal Revenue Service web site,
accessed October 2006.
111

based in principle off of a standard business mode1.18 Although public accounting has been
forced to endure the mistakes of a few, the industry wi11learn from those mistakes and grow
stronger as a result.

18

Open Compliance and Ethics Group, "Mission Statement," OCEG web site, http://www.oceg.orglMission.aspx,

accessed October 2006.
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Introduction
"It was the 90 'so The surge in the market made many awash in cash, there were millions of dollars to be made __ Senator Norm Coleman
and everyone else was doing it. "

KPMG, LLP Tax Scandal
Inevitably there are overlooked mistakes or details in anything technical and complex that
can lead to conflict. The tax code is no exception and occasionally contains stipulations that
when interpreted by outsiders yields a different result than was originally intended by the
lawmakers. These stipulations, termed loopholes, provide a great deal of ambiguity that
sometimes creates legitimate situations for tax savings, but can also create situations of potential
abuse.
This potential for tax abuse serves as the focus ofKPMG's19 tax scandal that took place
prior to 2003. A small number ofKPMG tax partners allegedly were involved in defrauding the
United States through engineering, aggressively marketing, and implementing several different
types of abusive tax shelters. Upon detection, certain KPMG practitioners who were involved
admitted to jointly administering tax losses of around $11 billion for their clients. When
translated into sheltered tax dollars, the Department of Treasury was deprived of approximately
$2.5 billion. In August of 2005 KPMG settled with the government and agreed to pay a $456
million penalty to defer criminal prosecution of the firm. To this date, the KPMG tax scandal
carries the largest fine for a United States fraudulent tax shelter case.20

19

KPMG LLP is a "Big-Four" public accounting fIrm whose primary practices are Audit and Tax. The Audit

practice offers advisory and assurance services to large and midsize businesses, while the Tax practice offers a
variety of federal, state, and local tax services to businesses and certain high net worth individuals.
20 "KPMG to Pay $4S6 Million for Criminal Violations in Relation to Largest-Ever Tax Shelter Fraud Case,"
Department of Justice press release (www.USDOJ.GOV,
August 29, 200S). From Department of Justice web site,
433.html, accessed September 2006
http://www.usdoj.gov/opalpr/200S/August/OS_ag_
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Governing Environment
Two frequent procedures that facilitate discovery of shelters and the eventual tax
collection are tax shelter registration in the fonn of list maintenance requirements and auditing.
Each functions as a tool for the IRS to detennine whether tax abuse is present. Even though the
taxpayer is ultimately responsible, the concept oftax shelter registration is less well known
among individual taxpayers because it is their preparer who usually registers the shelter. To
prevent tax abuse, the IRS requires that implementers of a shelter, whether tax practitioner or
taxpayer, disclose the specific shelter with the IRS. Then the IRS scrutinizes each one to
detennine whether or not it is legitimate. If the shelter is legitimate the taxpayer is allowed the
deduction, but if the shelter is found to be abusive the IRS then maintains a list of all abusive
sheltering transactions and those who have utilized them?l

Sections 6011, 6111, 6112 of U.S.

Code provide that it is unlawful to fail in disclosure and registration of transactions used as
shelters.22
Each taxpayer is also subject to auditing. Because the IRS' main function is enforcement
oftax law and the collection ofthe proper amount of revenue, it conducts audits to detennine
whether or not tax returns were filed correctly and to detennine whether or not the taxpayer paidin the correct amount. According to the IRS commissioner, only one million individual
taxpayers and one in six large corporations are audited every year.23
Individuals who create enonnous wealth are classified as "high net-worth" and present a
special interest to the IRS. An individual that generates a ten to twenty million dollar tax burden

21 Internal Revenue Service, "EP Abusive Transactions - Listed Transactions," Internal Revenue Service web site,
accessed September 2006.
http://www.irs.gov/retirementJarticle/0,,id=11955l,00.html,
22 Internal Revenue Service, "Listed Abusive Tax Shelters and Transactions," Internal Revenue Service web site,
12063 3, OO.html, accessed September 2006.
http://www .irs.gov/businesses/corporations/article/O"id=
23 David L. Perkins Jr., "Tax Audit Frequency is Rising," The Business Owner, 2005,
AuditLikelihood.html,
accessed September 2006.
http://www.vercoradvisor.com/articles/
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becomes valuable enough to overcome the cost effective threshold and warrants increased IRS
scrutiny. As Perkins points out, audits of individuals with high income have increased 74%
since 2002.24

A third and less frequent avenue leading to the discovery of potentially abusive shelters is
not a convention imposed by an external governing body, rather it is most likely of internal
origin. "Whistleblowing" has occurred in firms throughout various industries ranging from
financial services to tobacco to even governmental agencies and is the lawful, honest, and ethical
practice of speaking out against misconduct in order to alert proper authorities to stop any prior
abuse of the legal system.
Pertinent to abusive tax sheltering, there are two main positions where "whistleblowing"
is relevant. It is possible that a potential client who had been approached to buy illegal tax
products could speak out. But, it is more likely that a professional working for the firm
supplying illegal products and who has the proper background and knowledge ofthe situation
would speak out. This person is knowledgeable enough to determine whether or not
ethical/professional boundaries were crossed and whether or not laws were broken. In the
KPMG tax shelter scandal, Michael Hamersley, most recently a mergers and acquisitions
manager, decided to step up and act as the "whistleblower." He previously served in KPMG's
Washington National Tax advisory, which serves as a research division and subsequently
answers in-depth and complicated federal tax inquiries from KPMG U.S. tax practices.
Hamersley was eventually expected to market illegal tax shelters, but as a last resort he
notified the authorities?5

24David L. Perkins Jr., ''Tax Audit Frequency is Rising," The Business Owner, 2005,
http://www.vercoradvisor.com/articles/ AuditLikelihood.html, accessed September 2006.

-3-

Over the years tax law has become increasingly complex and in many instances severely
difficult for individuals and companies to comply with. As a result, the market offers services of
all expertise in correlation with various preparation demands. Thus, there is stratification
between tax service providers. Generally the level of aptitude increases from local CPA firms to
that of mid-tier firms26,to that ofthe Big-Four firms27. Very high net-worth individuals and the
most prominent firms in the world create a niche market requiring expertise provided by the
profession's leaders and in many cases only the Big-Four accounting firms have the resources to
serve such complex tax clients.
Three main factors provide for general conflict between the IRS and taxpayers. First, the
United States bases their tax collection largely on self assessment. Each taxpaying citizen is
expected to attain to the highest levels of citizenship and prepare or cause to be prepared their tax
return and subsequently pay-in to the government. But, for common taxpayers there is little
motivation to create additional expenses on top of their pre-existing tax liability by hiring
professionals to positively make sure that their taxes are in order. Many people attempt to save
on tax services and complete returns themselves. This can result in honest mistakes that either
understate or overstate one's tax liability.
Secondly, as described earlier, the tax code is at times open to interpretation. The
. ambiguity present in much of the tax litigation results in different stances taken by the IRS
25

U.S. SenateFinance Committee;Tax Shelters:Who's Buying,Who's Selling,and What's the GovernmentDoing

About It?, testimony of Michael Hamersley, KPMG Washington National Tax, October 21,2003,
02103mhtest.pdf, accessed September 2006.
http://www.senate.gov/-fmancelhearingsltestimony/2003testll
26Accounting ftrms classifted as Mid-Tier generally are larger than small local CPA ftrms but much smaller than the
Big-Four accounting ftrms. In many cases these ftrms are organized in the same fashion as Big-Four ftrms and offer
similar services but in most cases do not have a vast network of international offices. Examples include Crowe
Chizek LLC, Grant Thornton LLP, BDO Seidman LLP, McGladrey & Pullen LLP, Plante & Moran PLLC, and
Clifton Gunderson LLP.
27Accounting ftrms classifted as Big-Four ftrms are the four biggest accounting ftrms worldwide. They each create
roughly $16 billion a year in revenue and operate in approximately 140 different countries with over 100,000
employees. The ftrms ofKPMG LLP, PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, Deloitte & Touche LLP, and Ernst & Young
LLP comprise the Big-Four.
-4-

versus tax professionals. Due to conflicting interests, the IRS presumably is more inclined to
hold a consistent equitable stance on an issue that serves the public first, while a well
compensated tax practitioner working for a high net-worth client may be more inclined to hold
an aggressive stance.
Finally, the third major factor contributing to conflict between the IRS and taxpayers is
fraud. The most famous term used to describe this scenario is evasion. Historically, tax evasion
has been linked to organized crime and the works. However, tax evasion can be present without
the motivation to conceal vicious crimes or drug running; in fact it can arise if the taxpayer or
practitioner simply intends to reduce a taxpayer's liability.
In this situation, high net-worth taxpayers have motivation to seek out the best tax advice
and attempt to legally decrease liability. But, in some instances these taxpayers are so concerned
about preserving their wealth that they seek out or accept aggressively marketed illegal tax
advice resulting in the elimination or near elimination of tax burdens in the tens of millions of
dollars.
Internal Environment
The 1990s were profitable times for the American economy and as so, clients posted
increasing tax burdens year after year. This led many experienced tax professionals to find legal
ways to decrease their client's tax burden, either through efficient tax planning or legally
registered and implemented tax shelters.28 This expanding market also lead a much smaller
group of highly intelligent and experienced tax professionals to team up with lawyers, bankers,
and investment advisors to create tax savings for their clients. A small number ofKPMG
practitioners became extensively involved in this practice, where individuals from PwC, E&Y,
and select mid-tier firms also admitted to involvement.
28

Steve Blanc, CPA & J.D., interview by author, DeKalb, IL, September 22, 2006.
- 5 -

Three major factors that contributed to the frivolous decisions of these professionals are
opportunity, motivation, and rationalization. Many accounting firms experienced a lack of
internal control in the form of a flawed tax development and approval process that provided
opportunity for the fraud to occur. Control procedures were flawed in that partners who acted as
authorities on the sheltering activity surprisingly either perpetuated the fraud or issued a passive
vote of no confidence. Those who advised against illegal sheltering simply gave their advice and
continued with their own work voicing no concern against the fraud that was occurring around
them. Tax partners openly discussed the potential of new tax shelters and whether or not specific
components would work. In many cases the approval of a product depended on the potential
earnings it could provide, while ignoring legal and ethical considerations. Tax partners moved
forward with these tax products on the basis that the opinion letters issued to clients maintained
as little liability as possible for the issuing firm and also on the basis that practitioners involved
would charge a premium for these services in order to offset the risk of getting caught.29
Next, many involved professionals took part in rather ,uncommon billing practices.
Typically, compensation for the tax profession was not commission based, intending to prevent
this type of abuse. However, certain professionals involved in the promotion of abusive tax
shelters received a set percentage of the decrease in tax liability issued to clients.3o
Other lingering effects of a lack of internal control include the intimidating environment
created around the illegal tax shelter practice. Subordinates who were in favor of the abusive tax
sheltering practice were rewarded while those who held differing views were shunned.

29

U.S. Senate Committeeon HomelandSecurityand GovernmentalAffairs,PermanentSubcommitteeon

Investigations; U.S. Tax Shelter Industry: The Role of Accountants, Lawyers, and Financial Professionals, prepared
by the Minority Staff of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, November 18, 2003,
http://www.senate.gov/-govt-aff/_files/sprtl0834tax _shelters.pdf, accessed September 2006.
.
H~
- 6-

Moreover, participatory firms also violated auditor independence rules.31 This type ofleadership
encouraged the aggressive marketing of tax products to companies that had a pre-existing
relationship with the accounting firms, specifically audit clients. Lastly, tax professionals often
worked exclusively with a handful of banks, law firms, and investment advisors to achieve mass
production of these shelters.32
Stronger management and internal control could have mitigated these types of misdeeds.
One obvious suggestion is that any type of practice or service that creates a trend should stick out
and be investigated. The paper trail should then shed light on extensive compensation to certain
tax partners as well as whether or not SEC guidelines were being crossed. The paper trail should
have also shed light on the questionable repeated transactions between the tax professionals and
their partner firms. Overall, management should set the tone of the firm and if a hostile
environment is acceptable, firms will continue to have severe legal concerns.
Motivation is a second factor that contributed to the tax shelter scandal. Those involved
with illegal shelters were driven to engineer such products, market them, and conceal their
implementation. Internal competition was a major source of motivation, although the lure of
monetary compensation is not to be understated.
At the time the abusive shelters were being provided, two core functional areas besides
tax, audit services and consulting services, were becoming better revenue generators. Consulting
in particular, experienced a large fluctuation in correlation with the growing market. In turn, the
performance ofthe audit and consulting services exerted pressure on the tax function to pull their
31

U.S. SenateFinance Committee;Tax Shelters:Who's Buying,Who's Selling,and What's the GovernmentDoing

About It?, testimony of Michael Hamersley, KPMG Washington02103mhtest.
National Tax,
2003,
pdf,October
accessed21,September
2006.
http://www .senate.gov/_fmancelhearings/testimony/2003testll
32U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations; U.S. Tax Shelter Industry: The Role of Accountants, Lawyers, and Financial Professionals, prepared
by the Minority Staff of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, November 18, 2003,
http://www.senate.gov/-govt-aff/_files/sprtl 0834tax_ shelters.pdf, accessed September 2006.
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own weight for the finn. The Minority Staff of the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs reports that a line from an e-mail sent throughout the tax
function at KPMG during this period stated, "Look at the last partner scorecard. Unlike golf, a
board.,,33 This
low number is not a good thing. . . A lot of us need to put more revenue on the
was the type of competitive culture was passed down from partners and imposed on manager
level employees.
Eventually the situation arose where tax services needed a large revenue generator to
save face, and likewise, the tax shelter market presented an opportunity to engineer big revenue
through its exploitation. Just as the growing economy favored audit and consulting services, it
also increased the amount of individuals who established enonnous tax liabilities through stock
option activity, thus expanding the market for fraudulent tax shelters. Many partners in the
industry dealt with individuals who had potential taX liabilities in excess of $10 million.
Therefore, this increase in market demand provided tax professionals with a potential solution to
the internal earnings tension.
The final component that allowed for the promotion of illegal tax shelters was
rationalization. Many tax professionals rationalized their products as simply selling a loophole
that was well within the legal limits. Since they contrived a view that their product was entirely
legal, they assumed the IRS did not need to review it. In actuality, those involved had a
disregard for the law, and some practitioners associated with Big-Four finns assumed that the
IRS would never extensively review their work based on their reputation as one of the few
premier accounting finns in the world. Even iftheir clients' returns did come under audit

33

U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Permanent Subcommittee on

Investigations; U.S. Tax Shelter Industry: The Role of Accountants, Lawyers, and Financial Professionals,
by the Minority Staff of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, November 18,2003,
http://www.senate.gov/-govt-aff/
_ files/sprt 10834tax _ she1ters.pdf, accessed September 2006.
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prepared

scrutiny, the professionals believed there was little chance that the IRS would detect any type of
fraud since the transactions were tremendously complex and hidden by many layers of
deception.34

Hence, ex KPMG partners remain under fire due to Michael Hamersley's
whistleblowing. The following quote from Hamersley's testimony to the United States Senate
Finance Committee describing comments made by tax shelter promoters at KPMG serves as a
summary to the rationalistic views that select tax partners at KPMG and various other firms held,
"(i) the IRS will never discover the tax shelter because it does not have the resources or ability to
do so, (ii) even if the IRS does discover the tax shelter, the law will likely only be changed and
enforced prospectively thus the penalties will be minimal, and (iii) all public accounting firms
firms.,,35 These
are selling these tax shelters and the government cannot shut down all of these
three statements read like the following: the IRS is not smart enough to catch us, even if they do
catch us we won't be in trouble, and everyone else is doing it, so why can't we?
Character is defined by one's actions when no one is looking. Because of its self
assessment and lucrative nature, there may not be a service industry where character is more
important than that of public accounting. As witnessed with Arthur Andersen36, a firm's
integrity is its greatest asset.

34

u.s. SenateCommitteeon Homeland Securityand GovernmentalAffairs,PermanentSubcommitteeon

Investigations; U.S. Tax Shelter Industry: The Role of Accountants, Lawyers, and Financial Professionals, prepared
by the Minority Staff of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, November 18,2003,
http://www.senate.gov/-govt-affJ_files/sprtl 0834tax _shelters.pdf, accessed September 2006.
35U.S. Senate Finance Committee; Tax Shelters: Who's Buying, Who's Selling, and What's the Government Doing
About It?, testimony of Michael Hamersley, KPMG Washington
National Tax, October 21,2003,
http://www.senate.gov/_financelhearings/testimony/2003testll 02103mhtest.pdf, accessed September 2006.
36Arthur Andersen, formerly the largest accounting firm in the world, was the fifth firm in addition to the current
Big-Four that comprised the Big-Five accounting firms. Due to the Enron collapse and other corporate scandals,
Arthur Andersen was rapidly forced out of business.
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Abusive Sheltering Matrix

.

Partial list of the most profitable shelters utilized in the past, broken down by major
accounting firm:
KPMG
o BLIPS - Bond Linked Issue Premium Structure
o SC2 - S-Corporation Charitable Contribution Strategy

o OPIS - Offshore Portfolio Investment Strategy
o
E&Y
o
o
o
o
PwC

SOS - Short Option Strategy
CDS - Contingent Deferred Swap
COBRA - Currency Options Brings Reward Alternatives
PICANTE
SOAP

o FLIP - Foreign Leveraged Investment Program
o CDS - Contingent Deferred Swap
o BOSS - Bond and Options Sales Strategy

·

Son of BOSS

Others
o CARDS - Customized Adjustable Rate Debt Facility
o LILa - Lease InILease Out
o POINT - Personally Optimized Investment Transaction
o PICa - Personal Income Company
o COINS
o TRACT
o SLAPSHOT

.

Firms
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

linked to the KPMG, LLP shelter scandal:
KPMG, LLP - Lead accounting firm (Big-Four)
Presidio - Investment advisory firm (founded by two ex KPMG tax partners)
Quellos Group, LLC - Investment advisory firm
Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, LLP - Law firm
Bayerische Hypo-und Vereinsbank A.G. (HVB) - Investment Bank (Audited by
KPMG)
Deutshe Bank - Investment Bank (Audited by KPMG)
Wachovia Bank - Investment Bank (Audited by KPMG)
UBS A. G. - Investment Bank
Nat West - Investment Bank
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Illustration of Abusive Shelterin
"These sham transactions clearly lacked economic substance. Some may have believed there was a loophole that
supported these transactions. But, the lure of millions of dollars in fees clearly played a role in the decision on the
__ Senator" Norm Coleman
part of tax professionals to drive a Brinks truck through any purported loophole.

LegallIllegal

Tax Shelter Distinction

When discussing abusive tax shelters, it is important to make a clear distinction between
tax planning and tax evasion. First, in the United States, tax planning and tax avoidance are
terms that are used rather interchangeably. Tax avoidance is merely the legal steps taken on the
taxpayer's behalf to steer away from transactions or situations that are taxed.
Tax avoidance occurs when potential tax liability was never created and results from
legal planning advice. Regardless of ethics, it is smart business advice that takes advantage or
will take advantage of current or future tax law. A simple example involves timing issues. A
local CPA firm may recommend that their clients wait until they experience a specific loss
before selling investments that would yield an overall gain. Therefore, the gain on selling
investments will cancel due to the co-existing loss, and the client will have reduced tax liability
in comparison to the otherwise scenario.
Moreover, as a client's tax situation becomes increasingly complex, so does tax planning
advice. Other examples oftax avoidance involve using tax deductions, changing one's tax status
through incorporation or establishing an offshore company, trust, charitable remainder trust or
foundation in a tax haven.37 Still, if implemented correctly, each of these techniques are legal
and plainly maintain the taxpayer's reduced tax liability position.

37Wikipedia, "Tax Avoidance and Tax Evasion," Tax avoidance search, November 5, 2006,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wikiffax_avoidance, accessed September 7,2006.
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But, as tax complexity rises, the boundary between legal and illegal tax planning begins
to blur, and thus increases the potential for unintentional or intentional misstatement. It is fitting
that abusive tax shelters would need to be much more complex than the already complex tax law
in order to create tax savings without detection.
Tax evasion, specifically abusIve sheltering, is a criminal activity intended to eliminate or
reduce a taxpayer's liability through illegal means. Whereas legal tax planning usually occurs
before business transactions, illegal planning typically occurs after a taxpayer has completed
transactions and owes a certain liability on those transactions. This type of planning intends to
manipulate the tax system until the client's liability is significantly reduced or eliminated.
Wikipedia defines evasion as the following, "tax evasion is the general term for efforts by
individuals, firms, trusts, and other entities to evade taxes by illegal means. Tax evasion usually
entails taxpayers deliberately misrepresenting or concealing the true state of their affairs to the
tax authorities to reduce their tax liability, and includes, in particular, dishonest tax reporting
(such as declaring less income, profits or gains than actually earned; or overstating
deductions).,,38 To build upon this definition, the Government Accountability Office offers a
more specific description of a particular type oftax evasion. The GAO defines abusive tax
shelters as, "very complicated transactions promoted to corporations and wealthy individuals to
exploit tax loopholes and provide large, unintended tax

benefits.,,39

38Wikipedia, "Tax Avoidance and Tax Evasion," Tax avoidance search, November 5, 2006,
http://en. wikipedia.org/wikilTax _avoidance, accessed September 7, 2006.
39Government Accountability Office, GAO web site, http://www.gao.gov/, accessed September 2006.
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Charges Against KPMG Conspirators
In connection with the KPMG scandal, nineteen professionals were indicted under
Internal Revenue Code (26 V.S.C. 7201), Tax Evasion.4o In order for those defendants to be
found guilty, the prosecution has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the following:
(1) the "mens rea" or "mental" element of willfulness - the specific intent to violate an actually
known legal duty;
(2) the "attendant circumstance" of the existence of a tax deficiency - an unpaid tax liability; and
(3) the "actus reus" (i.e., guilty conduct) - an affirmative act (and not merely an omission or
failure to act) in any manner constituting evasion or an attempt to evade either the (A) assessment
of a tax or (B) the payment of a tax.41

Also, the same nineteen professionals were indicted under Internal Revenue Code (18 V.S.C.
371), Conspiracy, and three of those nineteen professionals were indicted under Internal
Revenue Code (26 V.S.C. 7212a), Obstruction of the Due Administration of Internal Revenue
Laws.42
While tax shelters can be implemented as legal tax avoidance techniques, these three
types of allegations disclose that tax shelters can also be implemented maliciously through a
drawn out process. First, the process involves a product or plan to plainly not pay taxes (attempt
to evade or defeat tax). Secondly, the process involves a collusion scheme in order to launch the
product (conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the Vnited States). Finally, the process may
involve a scheme to cover up the crime (corrupt or forcible interference). The next subsection
provides a description of common alleged illegal components found in and around KPMG's
abusive tax shelters that support one ofthese three main abusive functions.

40

"19 Individuals Chargedin Superseding Indictment Filed in Criminal Tax Case Related to KPMG Tax Shelters,"
Department of Justice press release (www.USDOJ.gov, October 17,2005). From Department of Justice web site,
http://WWW.usdoj.gov/usao/nyslPress%20Releases/October<>102005IKPMG%20Superseding%20Indictment%20PR.p
df, accessed September 2006.
41

Wikipedia,"Tax Avoidanceand Tax Evasion,"Tax avoidancesearch,November5,2006,

http://en. wikipedia.org/wiki/Tax
42

_avoidance,

accessed September 7, 2006.

"19 Individuals Charged in Superseding Indictment Filed in Criminal Tax Case Related to KPMG Tax Shelters,"

Department

of Justice press release.
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Abusive Components of KPMG Scandal
Every news article or press release surrounding this issue has proposed, in one fonn or
another, that a certain group of tax professionals acted in a fraudulent way or filed or caused to
be filed fraudulent returns or acted with the intent to defraud the United States. All of these
descriptions are vague and only allude to the fact that a select group oftax professionals possibly
broke the law. These types of statements fail to answer the question of how exactly the tax
professionals may have broken the law. The following will isolate major components of the
allegations and show why they were necessary:
Intent

_ Many tax shelters are built upon unusual investment

criteria. These trends prove

that those involved with abusive tax shelters purely had the intent to decrease tax liability. Proof
of intent lies in the fact that clients who were taking advantage of BLIPS, OPIS, or SC2, etc.,
which purportedly were long-tenn investments of around seven years, routinely withdrew from
the transaction after 45 to 67 days.43 Clearly, if a financial professional thinks there is a genuine
possibility that his client will make money off of a long-tenn investment, he will not advise the
client to withdraw after a fraction ofthe planned investment period.
It would be more reasonable for a financial advisor to create a complex web oflegitimate
investment transactions and suggest that 1 client out of 100 withdraw from the investment,
possibly due to personal financial needs. But, in the KPMG scandal, every client withdrew on
time, like clockwork. Hundreds of clients defected on these transactions in a rather short period
of time, 1996 - 2002, which established a trend of intent. In turn, this trend of ulterior
motivation lead many to ponder whether or not the transactions were legitimate in the first place.

43 United States of America v. Stein, Lanning, Smith, Eischeid, Wiesner, Larson, Pfaff, Makov, Delap, Gremminger,
Ruble, Ritchie, Bickham, Watson, Warley, Rivkin, Hasting, Rosenthal, Greenberg, Sl 05 Cr. 888 (LAK).
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Lack of Economic Substance - The investment products marketed by some professionals
at KPMG and Presidio lacked economic substance or purpose, meaning they were highly
unlikely to turn a profit and instead would only create tax savings.44 These transactions were
designed to yield tax benefits that were far greater than any profit potential. Therefore, there was
no legitimate business reason for hundreds of clients to purchase them. Regardless of the
inability to make money, financial advisors supplied the cover-up rationale that such investments
were an attempt to diversity client portfolios.
The California Franchise Tax Board issued the following before the U.S. Senate
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations:
Transactions used in FLIP and OPIS involve the use of offshore accounts, warrants, options and
stock redemption to accomplish a shifting of basis and creation of artificial losses. The
transactions require the cooperation of offshore accommodators such as Union Bank of
Switzerland. The transactions make use of Internal Revenue Code section 318 attribution rules
and Treasury Regulations section 1.302-2(c) basis adjustments to increase the basis of stock and
subsequent loss on the sale of that stock.45

In response to similar findings, the IRS issued a notice alerting taxpayers that tax benefits
resulting from this type of activity are specifically disallowed for tax purposes. It is the duty of
any qualified professional issuing these products to know whether or not this particular set of
investments is legitimate under the Internal Revenue Code. It is likely most shelter promoters
possessed this knowledge, but nevertheless issued these types of investment plans.
Irrelevant Boilerplate Opinion Letters - First, opinion letters serve the function of
insulating taxpayers from potential penalties if they are audited. When the IRS uncovers
questionable practices upon audit and asserts penalties, the taxpayer is able to claim that he or
she relied upon the advice or opinion of his or her CPA or that of a lawyer. Valid and reliable
44 United States of America v. Stein, Lanning, Smith, Eischeid, Wiesner, Larson, Pfaff, Makov, Delap, Gremminger,
Ruble, Ritchie, Bickham, Watson, Warley, Rivkin, Hasting, Rosenthal, Greenberg, SI 05 Cr. 888 (LAK).
45U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations; Statement of the California Franchise Tax Board, testimony
of Debra
Petersen,2006.
Tax Council IV,
accessed
September
November 18, 2003, http://hsgac.senate.gov/_files/111803petersen.pdf,
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opinion letters contend that questionable practices have been researched by the practitioner and
are "more likely than not" to withstand scrutiny by the courts.
Boilerplate opinions in the arena of abusive tax sheltering, however, often included many
false statements of security. The lawyers and accountants who issued opinion letters under these
circumstances may have had knowledge that the transactions would not pass scrutiny for tax
purposes if the true facts came to light. In most cases opinion letters were identical except for
names, dates, and amounts. Most surprising of all, the letters merely quoted what the code says,
instead of making an interpretation of law based on each client's specific and factual tax
situation.46
The following are common false boilerplate assertions in the context of the KPMG tax
shelter scandal:
1) "That the client requested KPMG's opinion regarding the U.S. federal income tax
consequences of certain investment portfolio transactions.'.47 Quite the opposite is true. There is
extensive evidence through email and personal correspondence that proves certain KPMG
partners' active marketing of illegal tax shelters. They sought out very particular clients that met
specific criteria, most important of which was a tax liability of at least $10 million. Partnership
culture at the time was in stiff earnings competition, and subsequently, managers were instructed
to "Sell, Sell, Sell" and to look the other way when signing off on unethical an illegal retums.48
This aggressive marketing lead to the intimidating environment described by Hamersley and
often left many non-supporters of the shelters with few options.

46Steve Blanc, CPA & J.D., interview by author, DeKalb, IL, September 22,2006.
47 United States of America v. Stein, Lanning, Smith, Eischeid, Wiesner, Larson, Pfaff, Makov, Delap, Gremminger,
Ruble, Ritchie, Bickham, Watson, Warley, Rivkin, Hasting, Rosenthal, Greenberg, SI 05 Cr. 888 (LAK).
48U.S. Senate Finance Committee; Tax Shelters: Who's Buying, Who's Selling, and What's the Government Doing
About It?, statement of The Honorable Carl D. Levin, United States Senator, MI, October 21,2003,
accessed September 2006.
http://www.senate.gov/-Ievinlnewsroomlrelease.cfm?id=214852,
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2) "That the investment strategy was based on the expectation that a leveraged position in
the Foreign Bank securities would provide the investor with the opportunity for capital
appreciation,,49 Clients could not have had legitimate expectations to profit from these
transactions when the marketing tactics that the involved practitioners employed included asking
the client exactly how much they wanted to pay in taxes and informing them that their entire tax
burden could be eliminated. From the very beginning the relationship between professional and
client had always been solely for the intent of tax savings instead of profitable investments.
Involved professionals were more interested in bragging about how much tax savings they could
create instead of describing profitable investments.
3) "That clients reviewed the economics underlying the investment strategy and believed
it had a reasonable opportunity to earn a reasonable profit from each of the transactions"So If the
client had an opportunity to review the opinion letter, they may have realized that regardless of
the inherent purpose of opinion letters, which was to provide professional and legal assurance on
questionable issues, involved tax professionals were attempting to reduce their own liability
instead. In effect, they were attempting to revert any responsibility incurred through the opinion
letters back to the client by saying the client contacted their respective firm for sheltering
services and the client believed the investments had economic substance. Clients most likely
would have disagreed with the opinion in that they would have recognized that there was little
chance to earn a profit. Instead, they trusted professional advice from some of the leading tax
practitioners in the world at KPMG, E&Y, and PwC!

49 United States of America v. Stein, Lanning, Smith, Eischeid, Wiesner, Larson, Pfaff, Makov, Delap, Gremminger,
Ruble, Ritchie, Bickham, Watson, Warley, Rivkin, Hasting, Rosenthal, Greenberg, Sl 05 Cr. 888 (LAK).
so Ibid.
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4) "That one ofthe participants in the transaction was a foreign person unrelated to the
other participants"Sl However, Presidio acted as the investment advisor to many transactions. In
the early days ofthese shelters John Larson and Robert Pfaff were tax partners who acted as two
key influences in the developmental process of tax shelters at KPMG. Later they left KPMG and
started Presidio in response to the need for a conspiring investment firm. As a result, both
Larson and Pfaff handled many shelter transactions in conjuncture with KPMG.
5) "That money was paid by the FLIP and OPIS clients for an investment component of
),,52 Clients asserted that they paid-in capital to an
the transactions (a warrant or a swap
investment. But, in most cases the paid-in capital represented consideration to KPMG, Presidio,
Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, and Deutsche Bank, etc. This carries further proof that any
supposed investment lacked economic substance. Clients merely paid a percentage of their
desired tax reduction as a fee to those who engineered the loss. Sham loan transactions followed
a similar procedure as well and are referenced later.
6) "That there was no evidence of a 'firm and fixed' plan to complete the steps making
up the shelter in a particular manner"S3 On the contrary, clients were instructed to complete a
specific series of steps in order. BLIPS is a perfect example. First, create an S-corporation.
Second, obtain a loan from a KPMG recommended bank. Third, partner with Presidio. Fourth,
transfer the "loan" to the partnership and use the "loaned" funds to "invest" in foreign currencies.
Fifth, defect from the partnership and investment sixty days later. And sixth, record the
transferred loan as a loss. It is clear that this particular process completed in this exact order was
pertinent to creating a loss. It is unbelievable on the part of some KPMG partners to assert that

51 United States of America v. Stein, Lanning, Smith, Eischeid, Wiesner, Larson, Pfaff, Makov, Delap, Gremminger,
Ruble, Ritchie, Bickham, Watson, Warley, Rivkin, Hasting, Rosenthal, Greenberg, 81 05 Cr. 888 (LAK).
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
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they never advised clients of such a plan since it is not feasible that a client would ever find
themselves taking these six steps in sequence for profitable investment purposes.
7) "That the clients were 'more likely than not' to survive an IRS challenge to the
transactions based on the 'step transaction doctrine' - a legal doctrine permitting the IRS to
disregard certain transactions having no economic substance or business purpose and the
purported tax effects of those disregarded

transactions.,,54 The mentioning of this doctrine in the

opinion letter, although maybe common practice, is borderline admittance that the string of
investments lack economic substance. It appears that the KPMG opinion writers wanted to cover
all possible bases. In addition, the tax partners promoting the shelters knew that this assertion
was false and thus, required every professional that promoted sheltering products to not leave
behind any physical materials describing the product since it would ruin all chances of the client
escaping the doctrine's negative impact.55
Sham Loans - In some cases, bank loans were an integral part of the shelters that some
partners implemented. Adding to the list of proof that the investments entered into by clients
were of no economic substance, the loans pertained to certain steps in the investment and were in
all material aspects fabricated. The Superseding Indictment states, ". . . none of the banks
assigned any capital cost to these purported BLIPS loans. Indeed, at least two of the banks did
not fund the loans at all.,,56 Mark Watson, an ex KPMG tax partner who was extensively
involved in abusive tax shelters, admitted that the loan transactions were, "nothing more than
window dressing.,,57 The result was fake loan transactions supporting concurrent, irrelevant
54 United States of America v. Stein, Lanning, Smith, Eischeid, Wiesner, Larson, Pfaff, Ma/wv, Delap, Gremminger,
Ruble, Ritchie, Bickham, Watson, Warley, Rivkin, Hasting, Rosenthal, Greenberg, SI 05 Cr. 888 (LAK).
55 Ibid.
56Ibid.
57U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations; Statement of Mark T. Watson, testimony of Mark T. Watson, KPMG Washington National Tax
accessed September 2006.
November 18, 2003, http://hsgac.senate.gov/_files/111803watson.pdf,
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investment transactions that together would ultimately create tax savings. In most cases the
banks never shifted funds to a position compromised by access to the client and never even
attempted to collect interest on the loan. Large investment banks, who often were internationally
headquartered and thus, somewhat removed, would simply sign their blessing and accept a
portion of the client's total consideration paid for the tax product.
Lack of Independence - Not only did the lack of independence stretch between KPMG
and their recommended investment advising firm, it stretched between KPMG and their
recommended investment banks as well. Many components of the sheltering process were
highly questionable and KPMG partners needed supporters in those lines of business that would
cooperate. It is already established that the investment advising was completed in large part by
ex KPMG tax partners at Presidio. Incidentally, the banking function was covered
predominantly by KPMG's SEC audit clients, which introduces auditor independence
infringement.

58

KPMG compromised the accuracy of future audits of these banking institutions by
recruiting them to record non-existent loan transactions. At the time, it was unforeseeable
whether or not those transactions would pay material respect in future audits. Regardless, there
was an undeniable transformation of the relationship between the investment banks and KPMG
as a result of co-conspiring in potential fraud.
The case may have been that involved tax professionals were genuinely attempting to
expand upon the audit business relationship, but there is little evidence to support that. The
KPMG tax group evaluated and approached each conspirator in the same fashion that they
approached potential clients. Surely a strong sales pitch was necessary to recruit one of the

58 United States of America v. Stein, Lanning, Smith, Eischeid, Wiesner, Larson, Pfaff, Makov, Delap, Gremminger,
Ruble, Ritchie, Bickham, Watson, Warley, Rivkin, Hasting, Rosenthal, Greenberg, Sl 05 Cr. 888 (LAK).
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nation's most prominent law firms as well as some ofthe world's most prominent banking
institutions.
Concealment/Intent to Deceive - Once all the pieces to the puzzle are in place, tax shelter
products were approved and ready to implement, co-conspirators were on board, and clients
agreed to buy the product, the final housekeeping issue was to conceal the fraud in a manner that
first, would not attract attention to the client's return and secondly, would circumvent the IRS if
the client's return fell under audit.
Creators of the tax shelters took special care in the design of the products hoping that the
IRS would not recognize, understand, or trace the potential fraud. This is specifically why
shelter promoters insisted on charging a lofty premium for their services. They needed to receive
large enough compensation to outweigh the risk of detection. Had the designers ofthe shelters
not taken such precautions, then IRS detection was imminent and none of the partners would
have sought involvement.59
Other than the extremely intricate and complex nature of the shelter products, KPMG
pursued additional sources of concealment such as:
1) Omitting Tax Shelter Registration - The law states that in every situation that a tax
shelter is used, the preparer has to register the shelter with the IRS and describe the nature of the
transaction(s). Then, the IRS issues a number, specific to the shelter, that each taxpayer who
utilizes the shelter is required to report on their tax return.60 This procedure is what "list
maintenance requirements" refers to and is a major resource that the IRS uses to track and
prevent sheltering abuse. The process makes shelters known to the IRS so that they can
investigate a shelter's use and determine whether any legal boundaries were crossed. This
59 United States of America v. Stein, Lanning, Smith, Eischeid, Wiesner, Larson, Pfaff, Makov, Delap, Gremminger,
Ruble, Ritchie, Bickham, Watson, Warley, Rivkin, Hasting, Rosenthal, Greenberg, Sl 05 Cr. 888 (LAK).
60

Ibid.
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registration requirement is part of self-assessment and tax preparers have the duty to inform the
IRS if they wish to use a specific product. Overall, list maintenance increases the transparency
of the tax shelter industry.
However, the professionals involved with KPMG's tax scandal decided not to notify the
IRS in order to disclose their shelters. Therefore, the clients who benefited from abusive shelters
did not have a list number to report on their returns. The primary reason that KPMG decided not
to register their shelters was that it would draw attention and increase the chances of detection.
Had the shelters been legitimate, tax partners would not have had objections to registering a
quality product and instead could have used list maintenance to their advantage in assuring
clients that their product was high caliber.
The professionals involved in this scandal rationalized the omission of registering the
shelters as a "business decision." They concluded that if they do register the shelters the IRS
will disallow the use of those shelters and in turn, competitors such as PwC and Ernst & Young
will gain market share. This strategy follows the, "if everyone else is doing it, I can do it too"
mentality and better serves the purpose of rationalizing an illegal act through the prediction that
since many are involved with the same type of crime, punishment can not be very harsh; the
authorities can't catch all of us syndrome.
Indeed, many accounting firms and law firms were taking part in this sheltering practice
but not all of them could be so harshly disciplined due to the precarious nature of public
accounting and the auditing/tax demand that they satisfy. The audit industry in particular has
undergone such tremendous change due to the collapse of Arthur Andersen and the introduction
of Sarbanes-Oxley that the government most likely decided only to make an example out of
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KPMG.61 The decision on behalf ofthe other players in the abusive sheltering industry to
abandon the practice after the first signs of distress, and in some cases return fees, was something
that KPMG advisors to the non-registration business strategy did not foresee. Because KPMG
partners continued with the practice, the firm became the primary target.
2) Grantor Trust Netting - Tax law requires that a taxpayer's return clearly report
income, gain, and loss items. Since the abusive shelters created losses that would attract
attention, shelter implementers, who also prepared their clients' returns, needed to hide these
false losses in order to decrease the chances of fraud detection. So, the KPMG partners simply
did not report individual loss items and instead reported a figure net of gains and losses.
Although other concealment methods involved the tricky purchase and sale of poor
performing stocks, a majority ofthe time KPMG partners used a method known as grantor trust
netting to hide specific loss items on the returns of many FLIP, OPIS, and BLIPS clients.
According to the Superseding Indictment, grantor trust netting is, "a trust that, because of certain
features enumerated in the tax code, is disregarded as an entity for federal income tax purposes.
RITCHIE and his co-conspirators devised a scheme to insert a grantor trust into a tax shelter
transaction, and then, rather than disregarding the grantor trust as required by the tax code,
reporting the large phony tax shelter loss and the taxable gain or income those losses were used
to offset only on the grantor trust information return, while reporting only the small net of those
numbers on the client's individual income tax

return.,,62 In the relevant scenario, grantor trust

netting was a practice based on the intent to unnecessarily added complexity. Abusive tax
sheltering depends on this type of strategy to reduce transparency.
61Sarbanes-Ox1ey (Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745) is a federa11aw passed in 2002 in response to rampant
corporate scandal. It established the PCAOB as well as increased reporting standards and whistleb10wer provisions.
The act created compliance problems for public companies that in turn were passed to major accounting firms.
62 United States of America v. Stein, Lanning, Smith, Eischeid, Wiesner, Larson, Pfaff, Makov, Delap, Gremminger,
Ruble, Ritchie, Bickham, Watson, Warley, Rivkin, Hasting, Rosenthal, Greenberg, Sl 05 Cr. 888 (LAK).
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3) Sham Attorney-Client Privilege - Once investigators became suspicious that
fraudulent activity had been occurring, their first instinct was to learn more about the situation
and what activity had been taking place. An excellent strategy to accomplish this is to review
correspondence between the abusive shelter providers, co-conspirators, and clients. After all, the
shelter providers had to explain how the shelters worked and had to direct each party through the
sheltering process.
KPMG conspirators acknowledged that the authorities would eventually request
information from the benefited clients as to what had been going on. In an attempt to combat
this type of inquiry, involved partners hid behind an attorney-client privilege when no true
privilege existed. Attorney-client privilege states that, "confidential communications between an
attorney and a client in the course ofthe professional relationship can not be disclosed without
the consent of the client. .

:.63 This law extends to tax practitioners who are practicing directly

under an attorney and means that privilege exists between an attorney, the attorney's accountant,
and client.
However, the tax shelter plans created by KPMG talent, and others, were not inclusive to
a direct attorney-client relationship. Law firms involved had no correspondence with the clients
and no legal professional relationship. In reality there was no need for any law firm to request
KPMG's services on any sheltering matter. In fact, KPMG recruited the law firms, not vice
versa, which additionally destroyed any extension of the attorney-client privilege. Instead, the
KPMG partners twisted the truth as an incentive for clients to abstain from discussing the
shelters.
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Further, it is unclear whether or not any partners asserted that their clients exercised tax
practitioner-client privilege, which given the true circumstances would be more applicable.
According to the IRS, tax practitioner-client privilege allows non-attorney tax practitioners to
benefit from the same basic principle of the attorney-client privilege except under some
circumstances relating to tax shelters as according to the following:
(a) Uniform application to taxpayer conununications with federally authorized practitioners
( 1) General rule

With respect to tax advice, the same conunon law protections of confidentialitywhich

.

apply to a conununication between a taxpayer and an attorney shall also apply to a
conununication between a taxpayer and any federally authorized tax practitioner to the
extent the conununication would be considered a privileged conununication if it were
between a taxpayer and an attorney.
(2) Limitations Paragraph (1) may only be asserted in(A) any non-criminal tax matter before the Internal Revenue Service; and
(B) any non-criminal tax proceeding in Federal court brought by or against the
United States.
(b) Section not to apply to conununications regarding tax shelters The privilege under
subsection(a) shall not apply to any written conununication which is(1) between a federally authorized tax practitioner and(A) any person,
(B) any director, officer, employee, agent, or representative of the person, or
(C) any other person holding a capital or profits interest in the person, and
(2) in connection with the promotion of the direct or indirect participation of
the person
7525)64
in any tax shelter (as defmed in section 6662 (d)(2)(CXii)). (Title 26, Sec

Incidentally, there would be no accountant-client privilege present due to KPMG's promotion
and the client's participation with tax shelters.
4) Obstruction of Investigations - A final and most desperate attempt against complete
detection was the continued denial of any participation with the above referenced shelters. In
response to a summonses requiring that a knowledgeable person from KPMG testify regarding
KPMG's involvement in tax shelter abuse, Jeffrey Eischeid took the stand. According to the
evasive.,,65 Also,
Superseding Indictment, Eischeid's testimony was, "false, misleading, and
"among other things, EISCHEID falsely denied that KPMG's fees were based on anticipated tax

64 Internal Revenue Service, IRS web site, http://www.irs.gov,
accessed September 2006.
65 United States of America v. Stein, Lanning, Smith, Eischeid, Wiesner, Larson, Pfaff, Makov, Delap, Gremminger,
Ruble, Ritchie. Bickham, Watson, Warley, Rivkin, Hasting, Rosenthal, Greenberg, Sl 05 Cr. 888 (LAK).
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benefits and misrepresented KPMG's role in devising, marketing, and implementing tax
shelters.,,66
In addition to the alleged false testimony, KPMG professionals handling the summonses
for documents in conjunction with the various tax shelters withheld the requested information
claiming that what they had already submitted was substantially complete relating to the
summonses. Subsequent testimony provided by other KPMG professionals also denied
involvement in abusive tax sheltering after the withholding of documents requested by the IRS.
Evasive testimony continued when KPMG professionals further refuted the acceptance of
fees based off of a percentage of the fabricated tax losses sold to clients. They denied the firm's
involvement in engineering, aggressively marketing, and implementing the shelters. They
denied that certain shelters were based off ofthe investor's (client's) defect £Tominvestment
transactions after a set time period.67 Overall, the efforts of some KPMG professionals to
obstruct investigations were denials of many components that the creators of these abusive
shelters strived to conceal through the "veneer of legitimacy."

,~

66United States of America v. Stein, Lanning, Smith, Eischeid, Wiesner, Larson, Pfaff, Makov, Delap, Gremminger,
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KPMG, LLP: Abusive Tax Sheltering Case Study
Appendix A offers a text description of how both BLIPS and SC2 works, while Appendix
B is an accompanying slide show that provides a visual description of the relationship between
the conspiring parties and transactions.
Appendix A: Walk-thru and description of BLIPS and SC268
Statement of Senator Carl Levin (D-Mich.) Before U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee
on Investigations on U.S. Tax Shelter Industry: The Role of Accountants, Lawyers, and
Financial Professionals
Appendix B: Accompanying Slides69
Bond Linked Issue Premium Structure (BLIPS)
S-Corporation Charitable Contribution Strategy (SC2)
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STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN (D-MICH)
BEFORE
U.S. SENATE
PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
ON
U.S. TAX SHELTER INDUSTRY:
THE ROLE OF ACCOUNTANTS, LAWYERS, AND FINANCIAL
PROFESSIONALS
November 18, 2003
Almost a year ago, the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations opened an indepth investigation into the development, marketing and implementation of abusive and
illegal tax shelters by professional firms like accounting firms, banks, investment advisors,
and law firms. I was then the Subcommittee Chairman and initiated this effort following our
Enron investigation which, among other misconduct, disclosed that company's use of
elaborate tax dodges. We have continued this investigation with the support of the
Subcommittee Chairman Norm Coleman, for which we thank him.
Unlike legitimate tax shelters, abusive tax shelters have no real economic substance,
are designed to provide tax benefits not intended by the tax code, and are almost always
convoluted and complex. Crimes like terrorism, murder, fraud and embezzlement produce

instant recognition of the immorality involved. But"abusive tax shelters are MEGOs that
~

means "My Eyes Glaze Over." Those who cook up these concoctions count on their
complexity to escape scrutiny and public ire.
The tax shelter industry of today is fundamentally different than it was a few years
ago. Instead of individuals and corporations going to their accountant or lawyer and asking
for tax advice, the engine driving the tax shelter industry today is the effort of a horde of
tax advisors cooking up one complex scheme after another - so-called "tax products"that
are unsolicited by any client - and then using elaborate marketing schemes to peddle these
products across the country.
In order to gain a deeper understanding of the issues involved in the marketing of
these tax products, the Subcommittee conducted in-depth case studies examining four tax
products designed, marketed and sold by a leading accounting firm, KPMG,to individuals or
corporations to help them reduce or eliminate their U.S. taxes. These four products are
known to KPMGand its clients as BLIPS, FLIP, OPIS, and SC2. We are releasing a 12S-page
Minority Staff Report today detailing what we found in these four case histories.
The testimony today will disclose a tawdry tale: a highly compromised internal review
and approval process at KPMG, highly aggressive marketing efforts to sell tax schemes aimed
at producing paper tax losses, and schemes which attempt to disguise tax reduction scams
as business activity in the case of BLIPS or a charitable donation in the case of SC2.
An excerpt from a long email by a top KPMGtax professional on whether KPMGshould
approve BLIPS for sale to clients illustrates the skewed priorities. He said the decision on
BLIPS came down to this:

2
"My own recommendation is that we should be paid a lot of money here for our
opinion since the transaction is clearly one that the IRS would view as falling squarely
within the tax shelter orbit."
Being paid "a lot of money" for a dubious tax scheme

-

that's what it all comes down to.

The testimony tOday will pull back the curtain on the pressure cooker environment
within KPMGto mass market its tax products to multiple clients. Again, one detail illustrates
the extent of the problem: the full-fledged telemarketing center that KPMGhas maintained
in Fort Wayne, Indiana and staffed with people trained to make cold calls to find buyers for
specific tax products. The telemarketing scripts, the thousands of cold calls made to sell
the tax product known as SC2, the re-visits to potential buyers who said no the first time,
all show KPMGpushing its so-called tax products.
The testimony today will also show the lengths to which KPMGwent to hide its tax
products and its sales efforts from the IRS. Despite its 2003 inventory of 500 active tax
products, KPMGhas never registered, and thereby disclosed to the IRS the existence of, a
single one of its tax products. It has claimed in court and to the Subcommittee staff that it
is not a tax shelter promoter. Today's testimony will disclose, however, that some tax
professionals within the firm advised the firm, to no avail, to register some of its products as
tax shelters. You will also hear about improper tax return reporting by KPMG, file cleanups,
and other efforts to hide their activities from the IRS and public scrutiny.
Finally, you will hear today and in the hearing on Thursday that, in ventures as large
and profitable as the marketing of these tax shelters, there were many professionals ready
to join forces with KPMGto carry out the complex financial structures required to camouflage
the tax schemes behind a facade of economic substance. These professionals included:
-Banks which financed the loans for sham transactions designed to create a veneer
of economic substance;
-Investment advisory firms which cooked up phony financial transactions to create
the appearance of a business purpose; and
-Law firms which wrote boiler plate legal opinions to justify dubious tax schemes and
shield taxpayers from penalties.
With such a formidable array of talent and expertise, potential clients were persuaded
to buy and use the deceptive shelters KPMGwas peddling and the U.S. Treasury was
effectively defrauded of taxes owed as a result.
BUPS and SC2 Case Studies

We are going to focus on two shelters, BLIPS and SC2. Let's first look at BLIPS,
which stands for "Bond Linked Issue Premium Structure."
Inside KPMG, BLIPS was called a "loss generator," because the intent of the tax
product was to generate a paper loss that the buyer could then use to offset other income
and shelter it from taxation. For this example, we'll suppose the BLIPSbuyer let's call him
the "taxpayer"- has a taxable gain or taxable income of $20 million that the BLIPS
transaction is intended to shelter by creating a $20 million paper loss.

-
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First Slide
The first step is the BLIPS taxpayer sets up a shell corporation, called a Limited
Liability Company or LLC. The taxpayer gives this shell company out-of-pocket cash
equal to 7% of the $20 million paper loss he wants to create. In this case, that
means the taxpayer provides $1.4 million. This money will be used for fees for the
firms that are part of this scheme and for an investment program set up as the fig
leaf of economic substance to hide what is really a tax scam.
Second Slide
The next thing that happens is a bank makes a so-called "7-year loan"of $50 million
to the shell company (LLC). The BLIPS taxpayer agrees to pay an above market
interest rate on the "loan," say 16%. Because he is willing to pay such a high
interest rate, the bank also credits him with a so-called $20 million "loan premium"
that, not coincidentally, is equal to the tax loss that the taxpayer is buying from
KPMG. (If the taxpayer later pays off the "loan" early, as planned, the bank will
charge a prepayment penalty that, not coincidentally, will approximate the "loan
premium" and make sure it is repaid.) The bank credits the taxpayer's account, which
stays at the bank, with the $50 million "loan" and the $20 million "premium" for a total
of $70 million.
There are more wrinkles. For instance, in order to get the $70 million, the taxpayer
and his shell company have to agree to severe restrictions on how the "loan
proceeds" can be used and to maintain "collateral" in cash or liquid securities in an
account at the same bank equal to least 101% of the "loan" and "premium" amount,
meaning about $70.8 million.
Think about that for a moment, because this collateral requirement is one key to
understanding why this "loan" is a sham. A cash collateral requirement of 101%
means, in effect, that none of the "loan proceeds" can really be put at risk. That
money - more than the amount of the "loan" itself - has to be kept safe in an
account at the bank which on paper "loaned" it.

Third Slide
Enter Presidio. They are the inv~stment advisory firm that works hand in glove with
KPMGand handles a lot of the leg work of the transaction. Presidio directs two
companies it controls, Presidio Growth and Presidio Resources, to participate in the
transaction.

Fourth Slide
Next, Presidio and the taxpayer's shell company form a partnership called a Strategic
Investment Fund (SIF). The taxpayer's shell company (LLC) contributes all of its
assets to the partnership-the
$1.4 million in cash from the taxpayer and the $70
million credit from the so-called "loan" and "loan premium." The Presidio companies
contribute about $140,000. Based on these contributions, the taxpayer has a 90%
interest and Presidio collectively has a 10% interest in the Fund.
.

Fifth Slide

Here's the switcheroo. The shell company decides, with the consent of the bank, to
assign or transfer the so-called bank "loan" to the Fund (SIF).

Sixth Slide
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Next comes the fig leaf. The Fund takes the money it has and supposedly engages in
foreign currency investments.
The Fund takes the so-called "loan proceeds" - the
$70 million - and simply converts it into Euros and puts it in what one bank calls a
"Synthetic Dollar Account." The Fund also signs a contract to guarantee it can
convert the Euros back to the same number of dollars at no risk in 30 or 60 days.
The Fund also puts at risk a very small amount of money - never more than what the
taxpayer has contributed - by shorting foreign currencies pegged to the U.S. dollar.
Not much of an investment program. While the BLIPS "loan" is supposed to last 7
years, every taxpayer that has bought it - 186 out of 186 - pulled out early - as
planned. They quit because the point of BLIPS is not to invest money, but to
generate a paper loss for tax purposes before the end of the tax-year.
Seventh (Last) Slide
Now we're at the unwind. At day 60, the taxpayer pulls out of the partnership. The
partnership - the Fund - repays the "loan" to the bank plus a "prepayment penalty"
to cover the "premium," so that the whole $70 million is returned to the bank. The
Fund then distributes any remaining assets to its partners, which usually is little or

nothing.

.

The taxpayer's $1.4 million is usually mostly gone in fees, but that's a price he was
more than willing to pay for a $20 million tax loss. Because of the way the loan was
structured, KPMGtold the taxpayer he can claim that his "cost basis" to participate in
the partnership is equal to the $20 million "loan premium" and the $1.4 million in cash
that he contributed to the partnership. That means he supposedly can claim a $21.4
million loss on his tax return.
If this doesn't make sense to you, it's because the whole transaction is an elaborate
concoction to create the impression of economic substance. The taxpayer didn't use
the $70 million "loan proceeds" at all - due to the collateral requirement, he parked
that $70 million in a Synthetic Dollar Account at the bank and used his own money to
make a few, safe currency transactions.
He could have made those without any
"loan" at all. The point of the "loan" was simply to generate a tax loss to shelter the
taxpayer's other income.
KPMGapproved BLIPS for sale in October 1999, and sold it to 186 people until, in
September 2000, the IRS listed it as a potentially abusive tax shelter. In one year, KPMG
obtained at least $53 million in fees, making it one of KPMG's top revenue producing tax
products.
Now let's look at the second shelter, SC2, which stands for S-Corporation Charitable
Contribution Strategy. An S-corporation is organized under Subchapter S of the tax code,
and its income is attributed to its shareholders and taxed as ordinary individual income
instead of corporate income. Instead of generating a phony paper loss, this tax product
generated a phony charitable donation.
First Slide:
The first step is that KPMGapproaches an existing S-Corporation,
one person, with a purported "charitable donation strategy."

usually owned by

The corporation takes several steps to prepare for the SC2 transaction.
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First, let's assume that the S-Corporation had 100 shares of common stock.
On KPMG's advice, the S-Corporation issues and distributes to its sole shareholder an
additional 900 non-voting shares plus 7,000 warrants to buy 7,000 more shares of the
company stock in the future. The corporation also issues a "non-distribution"
resolution stating that the company will not distribute any of its income to its
shareholders for a specified period of time, usually 2 or 3 years.
Next, KPMGintroduces the individual-shareholder to a qualified tax-exempt charity,
and the individual donates the 900 non-voting shares to this charity. The charity
signs a redemption agreement with the corporation which allows the charity to require

the corporation to buy back the donated stock after a specified period of time
usually the same amount of time specified in the corporation's
resolution.

__

non-distribution

At the time the charity signs the redemption agreement, it understands that the 5Corporation has issued warrants to the individual-shareholder,
which, if exercised,
would dilute the value of the charity's stock in the company. The charity also knows
that the S-Corporation is planning to distribute little or no income while the charity is
a stockholder.
The individual-shareholder
also provides the charity with a pledge stating that if, on
the date of redemption, the value of the non-voting stock has fallen below what it
was when donated, the individual will personally make up the difference with a cash
contribution to the charity. The pledge essentially provides the charity with a floor,
but not a ceiling, on the amount it will receive on the redemption date.
The redemption agreement and non-distribution resolution are the keys to
understanding why SC2 is a sham. Everyone participating in this situation knows from
the outset that the stock donation is not intended to be permanent. It is intended to
be temporary. The clear understanding of all of the parties is that the charity will be
selling the donated stock back to the donor in a few years.
But the appearance for the moment is that the S-corporation now has two
shareholders.
The charity owns 900 non-voting shares, and the individual owns 100
voting shares and 7,000 warrants.

Second Slide:
.
For the next 2 or 3 years while the charity is a shareholder in the S-Corporation, due
to the non-distribution resolution, the corporation "allocates" but does not actually
distribute 90% of its net income to the charity and 10% to the individual-shareholder.
The difference between allocations and distributions is critical. Under federal tax law,
an S-Corporation shareholder, unless tax-exempt, pays income tax on the net income
"allocated" to it on the company books, not on the cash actually distributed.
According to KPMG,that means that the 90% of company income allocated to the
charity is tax-exempt, while the individual has to pay taxes on only the 10% allocated
to him. That's true even though the charity often never sees a nickel of the money
supposedly "allocated" to it and agrees to forgo that income.

Third Slide:
Now we are two or three years down the road after significant net income has been
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accumulating inside the company, when the charity's redemption right kicks in. The
charity sells back the 900 non-voting shares to the S-Corporation for cash. While
this cash payment pales in comparison to the amount of sheltered corporate income,
because of the way the shares are valued, it is nonetheless a significant amount for
the charity.
Fourth Slide:
Now for the payout for the individual-shareholder.
The charity has sold back its
shares and is no longer a shareholder in the S-Corporation. All of the income that has
built up in the corporation for the last 2 or 3 years is distributed to the individualshareholder. KPMGadvises him that, on the 90% of the income "allocated" to the
charity, which is now his, he can claim the income is capital gains, taxable at the
lower capital gains rate, rather than the higher ordinary income rate.
.

KPMGapproved SC2 for sale in March 2000, and, over the next 2 years, sold it to

about 58 corporations. This tax product became one of KPMG's top tax products in 2000 and
2001, generating more than $28 million in fees for the firm. KPMGdiscontinued the sales in
late 2001. In early 2002, the IRS asked KPMGto produce documents related to SC2 and is
now reviewing the product.
End of Slides.
We may hear this morning that KPMGhas seen the light and that it and the other
large accounting firms no longer develop and sell these types of aggressive shelters. Let's
hope that is the case. However, the report we are releasing today depicts a powerful
engine going at full speed, developing and selling 500 "active tax products" as of February
2003, the response date for the Subcommittee subpoena. Having claimed all year to my
staff that these tax products are legitimate, KPMG's prepared testimony today is that the
firm has not only turned off, but dismantled that sOO-cylinder engine. List me as skeptical.
I'm afraid we cannot trust this industry to police itself. We need to take strong and
forceful action to stop the pilfering of our Treasury and the damage to the credibility of our
tax system. We need stronger penalties on tax shelter promoters, an end to auditor
conflicts of interest, a better economic substance test, and more enforcement dollars for the
IRS to go after tax shelter promoters and their abusive schemes.
Tliese and other actions
are outlined in the Report my staff has released today. These reforms are, of course, only
part of the answer. The firms involved in designing, hawking and implementing these dubious
tax products need to restore professional pride.
KPMGnow says it has stopped selling aggressive tax products.
PriceWaterhouseCoopers
has withdrawn from a number of transactions and refunded some
client fees. Ernst & Young says it will no longer market certain transactions to its public
company audit clients and will require those clients to obtain audit committee approval
before Ernst & Young will sell tax shelter services to their executives. That's a start. The
engine of deception and greed needs to be turned off, dismantled, and consigned to the
junkyard where it belongs.
That's what happened after the Enron collapse - exposure helped put an end to some
deceptive financial scams. If that is the result of this investigation, it will move the
production and promotion of abusive tax shelters out of big business, although it may well be
picked up by the fly-by-night hucksters from whom such behavior is less surprising.

......
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Resolution of Recent Abusive Shelterin
"I'm afraid we cannot trust this industry to police itself. We need to take strong and forceful action to stop the
pilfering of our Treasury and the damage to the credibility of our tax system. The engine of deception and greed
needs to be turned off, dismantled, and consigned to thejunkyard where it belongs.

--Senator

"

Carl Levin

KPMG Settlement
In late August of2005, after much red tape, KPMG admitted involvement with a host of
accusations against the firm in an effort to defer and ultimately escape criminal prosecution. In
light ofKPMG's testimony that since 2002 the firm has made sweeping changes in the way they
do business, the Department of Justice nevertheless issued a battery of unique stipulations for
KPMG to comply with.
First, KPMG was assessed a $456 million fine serving as a penalty for the following:
failure to register utilized shelters in accordance with tax shelter list maintenance requirements,
charging and accepting extravagant fees from clients, obstructing investigations causing the
statute oflimitations to run, and a large portion of the fine was based on lost taxes as a result of
KPMG's orchestration of the abusive shelters.7o The $456 million fine is the largest U.S.
imposed tax fine in history and proved to be the most widely publicized stipulation of the case.
However, if during the years of sheltering abuse, promoters caused substantially more damage to
the tax system than $456 million, one has to wonder what else the government could enact in
order to supplement restitution.
It was not feasible to issue a fine larger than $456 million because the firm has no
rational means to pay a larger amount in such a short period oftime. The fine was issued in
August of2005 and KPMG has until December 31st,2006 to comply. Instead, the Department of
70
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of Justice web site,

Justice ordered the tennination of functions relating to KPMG's wealthy individual tax advising,
which then reduced the earnings potential ofKPMG's tax practice. The tennination order
targeted the disbandment of the practices that were most directly involved with the fraud. This
included Stratecon and Innovative Solutions, two groups who's main function was to engineer
abusive shelters, as well as National Deployment Champions and Area Deployment Champions,
two groups who's main function was to provide extensive resources in the active marketing and
sale of abusive shelters. Further, KPMG is not allowed to sell pre-packaged tax products or
accept commission based fees. The agreement also forces KPMG to implement an ethics
compliance program. 71

Finally, after the reorganization ofthe tax practice KPMG has to allow one final
condition, the direct oversight of progress. According to the Department of Justice, the condition
includes, "the installment of an independent, government-appointed monitor who will oversee
KPMG's compliance with the deferred prosecution agreement for a three-year period. . .
Richard Breeden, fonner Securities and Exchange Commission Chainnan, has been appointed to
serve as the independent monitor. After his duties end, the IRS will monitor KPMG's tax
practice and adherence to elevated standards for two years."n In effect, this serves as the
equivalent ofa parole officer. IfKPMG tax does not maintain compliance with the agreement
then the finn risks a prolonged monitoring period or possibly prosecution for conspiracy.
Reaction of Big-Four Accounting Firms
Ever since the IRS uncovered the widespread use of abusive tax shelters, the Big-Four
accounting finns ofKPMG, PwC, and E&Y, at some point, have made similar claims of
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refonnation from borderline illegal practices to that of the highest quality and professionalism.
All three acknowledged that the regulatory environment was changing and that the market for
such shelters was also changing. Although some finns appeared more remorseful than others by
claiming that they issued a refund of certain fees, they all expressed that the abusive products
sold in the past are no longer offered and that the business functions responsible for developing
and marketing those tax products were dissolved.
Moreover, each finn claimed that they have reexamined their procedural policy, thus
resulting in the implementation of a new approvals process for the introduction of new customer
specific tax products. Also, some ofthe finns claimed that they replaced or introduced
additional quality control functions. For example:
E&Y
·

·

·
·

Established a new high-level and full-time position - Americas Director for Tax Quality
to help ensure that the fIrm maintains the highest possible standards of practice, policy,
and procedures;
Established Tax Technical Review Committees for each of our key functional areas in tax
to provide detailed technical reviews of signifIcant issues and help assure consistency in
interpretation of the tax law;
Established a new Tax Review Board, with members that include senior executives from
outside the tax practice, to provide a fmn-level view with respect to tax practices,
services and relationships; and
Established a new tax practice "hotline" to allow employees to provide anonymous input
about any tax-related matter.73

-

PwC
·

·

Developed a comprehensive quality review program to prevent our participation in
abusive tax shelters and to ensure that we provide the highest quality advice to our
clients.
SignifIcant resources have been committed to a quality and risk management group that
is independent of any business unit and reports directly to the leader of the Tax practice.
This group is centralized with representatives embedded throughout our organizational
levels (national, regional, and business unit). The function includes six full-time partners,
supporting staff and an additional eight partners spending signifIcant amounts of time in
this activity.
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KPMG
·

·

·
·

Over the past three years, KPMG has developed an increasingly more rigorous and
formal review and oversight procedure within our tax practice. All tax strategies must
undergo three levels of review and approval.
o The new position of Partner in Charge of Tax Risk and Regulatory Affairs is
responsible for analyzing each tax strategy proposed by the ftrm to determine if
it could put KPMG and our clients at risk.
o The Partner in Charge of our WashIngton National Tax practice must sign off on
the technical merits of all signiftcant tax strategies.
o The Department of Professional Practice - Tax reviews all strategies to ensure
that they are in compliance with the ftrm's policies and procedures.
We have also revised our procedures with respect to list maintenance and registration
obligations under the Internal Revenue Code.
In 2002, KPMG implemented a ftrm wide Compliance and Ethics Hotline.
We have put in place more stringent rules about offering tax services to executives at our
SEC-audit clients. 75

There appears to be a correlation between a firm's level of conflict over the abusive
shelters and its level of change. KPMG, who finally agreed to a $456 million dollar penalty,
enacted more quality control initiatives than PwC who quietly settled with the IRS and quickly
returned engorged fees. Surely, these new quality control procedures have substance in their
organization, but are they anything more than window dressing to the IRS, clients, and general
public?
Prior to conflict with the IRS, each of these firms already had quality control functions
serving as rigorous review processes and approval processes. Now, they simply have more of
the same type of review functions, none of which have addressed the fundamental aspect that
firm culture is often passed down from top to bottom. These new divisions only make it
necessary to involve a few additional tax minds to approve an abusive tax product. The above
improvements negate the fact that each firm is still open to the potential of high level
collaboration over the next amazing opportunity that evolving market conditions will produce.
Previous conspiring approval groups based their decision on whether or not a product
will pass scrutiny. It remains to be proven that since a few additional approval processes were
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created, firm wide culture will eliminate the possibility of risky practices on behalf of a few.
This raises the speculation of whether or not these new initiatives hold a hidden agenda.
Undoubtedly firms want to offer the highest quality services to clients while maintaining the
greatest degree of professionalism. But, were these quality improvements also intended to
decrease the chance of getting caught when they promote such ambiguous and complex types of
strategies in the future? If so, it makes sense to bulk up areas of guidance that were responsible
for forecasting whether or not problems would arise as a result of direct involvement in
potentially abusive tax shelters. Increased resources should lead to more in-depth and better
reports on what products should be issued with such a high degree of intensity.
Firms should introduce a more diverse type of oversight control, such as an ethics
division, instead of additional quality control groups that serve the same function as the previous
control groups that they replaced or are complimenting. The new groups may be just as
susceptible to the same type oftop-down abuse by a few as the previous control divisions were.
Fraud may be just as likely to run its course whether there are 15-20 tax partners collaborating
and approving shelters as it is ifthere are 30-35 partners working the same managerial, oversight
function. A profitable new opportunity to serve an expanding market is likely to appear just as
tempting to the additional approval officers as it did to the pre-existing approval officers.
Likewise, some of the Big-Four accounting firms have asserted that as an extra layer of
control, in-charge or executive partners from outside the tax practice will assume the
responsibility of reviewing tax products or strategies. Though this type of control is beneficial in
that persons unrelated to the tax function may be better able to form an overall opinion ofthe
legitimacy of a particular tax strategy and determine ifthe strategy meets regulatory
requirements, it still does not establish true independence. The additional executive partners are
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still proponents ofthe finn's success, only they work in audit or consulting. The above
descriptions ofthis type of "independent" quality control failed to include why a scenario will
not occur where the market will again present an incredible opportunity to the tax function, and
due to a lack of expertise in tax, the audit and consulting executive partners responsible for
outside guidance take the word of their tax expert colleagues and join the bandwagon of support
for an unknowingly abusive product. After all, the success of a finn's tax function is sure to
benefit the finn as a whole. The outside executive partners have little incentive to act otherwise.
Increasing diversity between control functions will help increase independence by
attacking the problem from a different angle. Instead of implementing new or additional tax
product approval groups, finns should first fix existing approval groups and secondly create an
ethics support or advisory service. The main concern of this group should be to detennine
whether the tax function is operating with legitimate intent. Thus, the ethics advisory group
would be able to access all documents to detennine the following: if compensation is
commission based, if tax clients are properly independent from audit clients, if tax professionals
are in collusion with a myriad of other financial and legal professionals in order to serve an
individual client, iftax professionals are issuing boilerplate opinions, and overall if tax
professionals are acting in everyone's best interest by issuing tax advice with clear purpose other
than to benefit clients and themselves at the expense of the United States Treasury.
This type of control should also differ on the basis of incentive. Where previous approval
controls were open to intra-finn competition of earnings figures, the ethics advisory group
should operate on a slightly different incentive with monetary compensation based solely on the
goal of exposing and reporting finn-wide those who are not adhering to a publicly established
ethics framework. The long list of corporate scandals has created opportunity for professional
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services groups to begin marketing ethics framework advice. One such organization whose
purpose is to create ethics framework awareness is the non-profit Open Compliance & Ethics
Group. 76

Reaction of Governing Agencies
One of the first initiatives resulting from the discovery of flagrant tax abuse was a
120-day grace period for taxpayers. In 2002, taxpayers who bought abusive tax shelters were
able to come forward and pay back taxes, interest, and certain penalties in order to forgo more
onerous civil penalties. The IRS made it clear to the public that those who have purchased and
used abusive tax shelters and have not come forward will be sought after and thoroughly
prosecuted. Mark Everson, IRS Commissioner, had the following to say, "Those who elected to
settle did the right thing. We have already begun to contact the taxpayers who didn't take us up
on the offer and expect to begin enforcement action soon.',77 In order to show magnitude and
make use of fear tactics, Everson continued, "We will vigorously pursue all those who
participated in Son of Boss deals but did not take advantage ofthe settlement initiative.,,78

"If

you're thinking about cheating on your taxes, think twice. The IRS is ramping up its
enforcement efforts, particularly for high-income individuals and corporations. Where we need
to, we turn to the Justice Department to take people to COurt.,,79
Although, Son-of-Boss deals were primarily sold by PwC, information gained from
taxpayers who did come forward proved to be the underlying motivation for such encouragement
from the IRS. Though it was important to collect from honest and willing taxpayers, the IRS
76Open Compliance and Ethics Group, "OCEG Online," OCEG web site, http://www.oceg.orgl, accessed October
2006.
77
Internal Revenue Service, "EP Abusive Transactions - Listed Transactions,"InternalRevenue Serviceweb site,
http://www.irs.gov/retirement/article/0..id=119551.00.html.
accessed September 2006.
78Ibid.
79
"Justice Department Notes Increase in Tax Enforcement," Department of Justice press release (www.USDOJ.gov,
October 17, 2005). From Department ofJustice web site, http://www.usdoj.gov/taxltxdv05167.htm. accessed
September 2006.

- 34-

was exceptionally interested in the disclosure of information about the practitioners who sold
these products.
This type of investigation and pursuit parallels that of the controlled substance industry.
The IRS interrogated taxpayers to learn which firms and partners were involved based on the
same principle that the DEA interrogates street-level drug dealers in order to obtain information
on the drug boss. With willing taxpayers coming forward, the IRS would have information to
increase control over the sheltering industry, and with a turnout of roughly 1,500 taxpayers this
proved to be a good start for the IRS.
Next, a list oflegislation proposals accumulated in response to the tax abuse. Carl Levin,
Michigan Senator, proposed the Auditor Independence and Tax Shelters Act. In a report to the
Senate, Levin proposed the following, "the Auditor Independence and Tax Shelters Act would
bar an accounting firm from auditing the books of any publicly traded company to which it has
sold a tax shelter."so Senator Levin specifically targeted the unethical practice of accounting
firms recruiting audit clients to sell shelters to. He acknowledged the severe lack of
independence that such a relationship creates. Auditors would, in effect, audit the work of tax
partners from their own firm. Once this type of relationship is established, the auditor's opinion
becomes less credible.
Moreover, this act was also aimed at decreasing an accounting firm's market for
appropriate tax shelter clients. As described above, certain KPMG practitioners and others had
set criteria that were necessary for potential clients of the abusive tax shelters. It is much easier
for a financial services firm to determine whether or not a client meets the criteria if they have
been auditing the client for the past four or five years.
80
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As a compliment to this type of proposed legislation, the IRS plans to be pro-active in
notifying the public of new rules, guidelines, and listed shelters. As a type of "good cop - bad
cop" strategy, versus the aforementioned fear tactics, the IRS also intends to create a friendly and
permissive atmosphere to encourage taxpayers and promoters to come forward with sheltering
inquiries. "Published guidance of abusive transactions" as termed by Everson, is based on the
following theory, "Our willingness to indicate transactions that the Service believes are
permitted under the tax law should encourage promoters and taxpayers to come to us with
transactions that they believe are technically sound.,,81 The IRS intends to make the public more
aware ofthe risks involved with abusive tax sheltering activity in hopes of curbing the market of
taxpayers eligible for the high income abusive shelters.
These statements proposed by Everson bring up the topic of how his good cop- bad cop
attitudes will affect self-assessment. Clearly Everson's goal is to increase social responsibility
and create higher standards for taxpayers who are valid clients to tax shelters as well as tax
practitioners who possess the skill to promote tax shelters. But, there isn't much reason to
believe that a few motivational comments will do the trick. Sure, for the next few years those
who were borderline involved or wholly involved in abusive tax practices will be deterred by
Everson's bad-cop, vigorous prosecution comments. And, those who can present significant
proof for a "more likely than not" opinion on the legality oftheir shelters will come forward for
Everson's good-cop blessing on their efforts to shelter taxes within the legal limits. Yet, the
future problem may arise when five to ten years down the road tax practitioners once again
become increasingly bold with their intentions and loose with their interpretations.
81
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Therefore, IRS has two particular strategies to create sustainability in the deterrence of
abusive tax sheltering. Unfortunately, due to the nature of intricate abusive sheltering and an
inability to forecast the next miracle shelter, both strategies are after-the-fact solutions and can
only benefit the tax system after a shelter has surfaced. First, the IRS can petition for forward
looking legislation that pinpoints exact flaws in current law and attempts to curtail additional
fraudulent activity in the future. Secondly, the IRS can petition for backward looking legislation
that retroactively fixes flaws and thus holds newly established abusive shelter participants liable
for past actions based on the premise that current law was intended to bar such activity and was
inadequate in doing so.
Among expected benefits of$137 billion for corporations and businesses, a recent bill
signed into law on October 22, 2004 provides for a crackdown on abusive tax shelters by
imposing tougher penalties and expanding or creating new laws in the major problem areas of
shelter fraud. The American Jobs Creation Act of2004 (p.L. 108-357) is an example of forward
looking legislation that created stiffer penalties for the following acts:
·

·
·
·
·

taxpayers' failure to disclose reportable (including listed) transactions;
taxpayers' understatement of tax where the understatement is attributable to a reportable
tax avoidance transaction;
taxpayers' failure to report transactions or accounts maintained with a foreign financial
entity;
material advisors' failure to comply with new information return requirements or existing
regulations requiring that investor lists be maintained and provided to IRS; and
tax shelter promoters' making or furnishing false statements in comiection with the
organization or sale of abusive tax shelters.82
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The act also introduces the following:
·
·
·

·
·

extends the statute oflimitations for taxpayers who fail to disclose listed transactions;
expands IRS ability to take civil injunction action against persons promoting tax shelters
or aiding and abetting the understatement of tax liability;
enables the Treasury Department to use censure and monetary fines as additional
sanctions against practitioners who fail to comply with Circular 230 rules governing
practice before IRS;
provides an exception to confidentiality privileges for all tax shelter transactions; and
requires taxpayers subject to SEC filing rules to disclose certain tax shelter related
penalties.

83

The American Jobs Creation Act was directed towards preventing the continued abuse of
the tax system by substantiating penalties of existing laws. One additional penalty was in the
area of tax shelter list maintenance and presumably was enhanced due to the nature of its ability
to expose potentially abusive products. Stiffer penalties increase the incentive for honesty in
self-assessment. The IRS hopes that as a result, taxpayers will become more aware of listed
transactions and will be more likely to clear transactions with the IRS before taking the risk of
using them intentionally or even haphazardly.
A second major change dealt with the practice of issuing boilerplate opinion letters.
Again, stiffer penalties are now in place to encourage honesty and restore the professionalism of
an important liability practice among lawyers and accountants. The very basis of opinion and
engagement letters is to establish the terms of services provided and to state on paper the
practitioner's belief of what is to result if the client undertakes certain transactions or practices.
These statements are worthless without a solid ethical and legal reputation of the issuing firm to
accompany them.
Moreover, without an impeccable reputation, a firm would virtually operate without the
means to accomplish the function of opinion and engagement letters, which ultimately would
lead to that firm's demise. Arthur Andersen serves as a great example as to the damage that can
83Internal Revenue Service, "New Tax Law Provisions Enacted to Combat Abusive Tax Shelters," Internal Revenue
Service web site, http://www.irs.govlbusinesses/article/0..id=149707.00.htrnl.
accessed September 2006.
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result from a panicking market's lack of trust. The entire firm dissolved in a matter of months
stemming from the actions of a few. With potentially increased penalties for boilerplate opinion
letters, it is the government's intent to preserve the jobs and well being of the other 100,000
employees who do attest to the highest level of ethical and professional standards on a consistent
basis, while penalizing those who attempt to take advantage of the system and firm's reputation
for a short period oftime. The government's intent does not stop at the firm level, but extends to
preserve the well being of clients, creditors, and all other parties who hold a business relationship
with these firms. A tax client should be able to rely on a professional's opinion that they are
dealing within the boundaries of the law. lfnot, the client does not receive what they are paying
for, which is world class service from a world class organization.
The American Jobs Creation Act also intends to prevent the continued abuse ofthe tax
system by creating new laws that specifically target newly exposed weaknesses from the abusive
activity recently disclosed through settlements between the IRS and various accounting firms.
For example, since KPMG was successful in obstructing access to pertinent documents in the
past and causing the statute of limitations to run, the new legislation extends the statute of
limitations to assess taxpayers who do not comply with list maintenance registration. In the
future this will allow more time for the authorities to figure out what the specific crimes are and
who is responsible. This is an important addition to current law since abusive tax schemes are
becoming more and more complex. In the event of another abusive sheltering ring, a lengthened
statute of limitations may lead to the direct prosecution of certain tax practitioners.
The act also allows the IRS to make greater use of temporary and permanent civil
injunctions against those who aid and abet tax sheltering or create an illegal decrease in tax
liability. This law establishes a powerful threat to those who contemplate tax abuse because the
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IRS can now take away their means for a living. Currently it is unclear how inclusive this piece
of legislation will be. The context of the KPMG scandal involves investment bankers, lawyers,
investment advisors, and accountants as parties who aided and abetted tax sheltering. Services
provided from those four functions necessarily combined to create specific and well defined
abusive tax products. It will be interesting to learn whether or not injunctions will be applied to
professionals outside the accounting industry.
Although, since the act's inception injunctions have only been issued on the part of tax
abuse promoters, tax return preparers, and employers who failed to pay correct amounts of
withholding tax. Nevertheless, to show the effect of new legislation on the rates ofinjunctions
issued, from 2000 through 2004 the government has issued roughly 103 injunctions to abusive
promoters and roughly 17 injunctions to abusive preparers with approximately 49 of the 120
injunctions being issued in 2004, the same year that the American Jobs Creation Act became
law. 84

A second and less frequently enacted option available to the IRS for creating
sustainability in the deterrence of abusive tax sheltering is to petition for backward looking or
retroactive legislation. According to Wikipedia, "A retroactive law changes the legal
consequences of acts committed or the legal status of facts and relationships that existed prior to
the enactment of the law.,,85 A typical and more well known term for this principle is "Ex Post
Facto."
Calvin H. Johnson, a law professor at the University of Texas-Austin, provided in his
expert testimony before the Senate a description ofthe Congressional attitude towards the
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retroactive principle, "Congress adopts retroactive amendments only when in its judgment the
misinterpretation is both shocking to ethical norms and substantial in amount and because the
misinterpretation is not what the tax law intended to do.,,86 Therefore, it is most likely tougher
for the IRS to get Congress' approval on retroactive legislation as opposed to new legislation
because it presents a potentially dangerous slippery-slope. Even though it proves to be a very
effective tool for the IRS in tax collection since at Congress' decision, taxpayers who previously
found ways to avoid tax liability suddenly have are-emergence ofthe same liability. Retroactive
law changing needs to be reserved for extreme cases such as the FLIP and BLIPS schemes.
Section 358 is an example ofthe retroactive principle in action to fix flaws that
accommodated BLIPS and Son of BOSS. The Community Renewal Tax Relief Act, enacted on
December 22, 2000 made the effective laws applicable by more than a year prior, to October 19,
1999. Originally, section 358 ofthe Internal Revenue Code provided that basis in shares of stock
is reduced by liabilities assumed. The amendment changed this assumption of liabilities
provision in order to take away cost basis when corporations acting in the BLIPS scheme
assumed the future obligation of the co-conspiriting shareholder.87 Thus, the amendment to
section 358 fixes the unintended loophole that FLIP and BLIPS previously legally took
advantage of by recognizing the intent ofthe shelter promoters and realizing that such complex
transactions, including the transfer of shares and loans between taxpayer and s-corporation, did
not hold merit.
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Analysis of Expert Recommendations
There have been many additional recommendations proposed to increase the integrity of
the tax profession and help prevent future abuse of the United States taxation system. Some
recommendations are simple logical responses to the underlying problems, while others are more
involved. All of the following recommendations intend to decrease the attractiveness of and
opportunity for abusive sheltering. Nevertheless, some may present negative implications.
One common recommendation among the experts was to create greater degrees of
independence among tax service professionals. The Minority Staff of the Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations previously asserted that the AICPA, American Bar Association,
and American Bankers Association, all of whom are industry oversight bodies, should enhance
professional standards by outlawing the issuance of opinion letters by tax professionals who have
a conflicting interest with the tax advice or product. 88 Conflict of interest includes practitioners
who have provided support in the form of accounting, legal, design, sales, and implementation
services of a product. Most importantly, conflict of interest covers practitioners who have a
financial tie to particular tax advice or to a product. 89
Creating independence between the practitioners who create, sell, and directly
profit off of tax shelters and practitioners who draft opinion letters is, to a lesser degree,
preventing tax practitioners from auditing their own work. As described above, an opinion letter
is a firm's stance or legal position on the specific advice or product offered to a client. Thus,
firms want to issue quality, legal advice and are reluctant to label their own advice as sub-par or
even inadequate. Practitioners that experience a direct correlation between developing a
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lucrative new tax product and bending the rules on drafting an opinion are tempted to issue
statements that may be technically accurate but do not fully serve their purpose. Even if the
practitioner's intent is legitimate, he or she will still be influenced by the potential economic
benefits of using his or her own product. Therefore, the Minority Staff of the Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations argues that having colleagues within the firm review new tax
advice or products can establish an additional layer of independence by preventing egotism.
Further, Tax Counsel Debra Petersen of the California Franchise Tax Board
suggested a very similar upgrade in accordance with the independence initiative:
Extend Sarbanes-Oxley to tax return preparers. If a return preparer or related party has marketed,
sold, or recommended a tax shelter, the fIrm and related parties should not be allowed to sign the
return for that year or any year in which the taxpayer benefIted from the shelter. Another return
preparer would be required to prepare and sign the return. The other preparer would then need to
independently review the transaction to determine if the position is appropriate under the tax laws
and to include disclosure statements in order to avoid liabilities.9O

This recommendation proposes that a higher level of independence can be achieved by shifting
liability within the firm from the practitioners who develop tax advice or tax products to
colleagues who were not involved in the developmental processes, thus forcing the colleagues to
heavily scrutinize the product before endorsing it with their own signature. Fear tactics serve as
this recommendation's basis. First, tax partners should be skeptical about signing something
they have had no involvement in, and secondly they do not want to take the blame for issuing
incorrect advice on a return, as the preparer's signature establishes.
However, the principle of both recommendations creates superficial assurance. These
recommendations may better be implemented as internal controls at professional service firms,
aimed at catching honest mistakes instead of preventing large scale abuse. These propositions
are insignificant to the possible widespread collaboration between intra-firm colleagues. The
90
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KPMG scandal resulted due to daring culture that was passed down from a few firm-wide
leaders and in turn managers were pressured to play ball. The independence measures listed
above would be very easily circumvented by a group often highly motivated partners who all
share the same goals and experience. They would simply set up an assembly line for these three
newly independent functions oftax shelter engineering, opinion letter producing, and tax return
preparing. After a few months they would rotate duties.
Next, the Minority Staff proposed that the AICP A, American Bar Association, and
American Bankers Association should heighten professional standards by preventing their
professions from practicing aggressive sales tactics such as cold calling, telemarketing, setting
explicit revenue goals, and accepting commission fees based on planned tax savings.91 Petersen
seconded this recommendation by stating, "The AICPA should prohibit all contingency fees and
fixed fees not based upon actual hours incurred for tax services. Use of contingency fees results
in aggressive positions being taken and over inflation of the benefits.,,92
This type of recommendation directly attacks the motivational component of the ftaud
triangle. Commission based fees act as a triple-dog-dare to tax professionals and encourages
them to push the legal and ethical envelope. It makes sense that a tax professional would not
spend extra time and effort researching possible customer specific tax strategies if they were not
going to receive adequate compensation. Some practitioners at KPMG, PwC, and E&Y all
marketed generic shelters anyways. Their shelters were not customer specific products, instead
the only requirement to become eligible for these services was an enormous tax burden and a
willfulness to complete each transactional task asked ofthem by their tax advisor. Practitioners
91United States Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, US Tax Shelter Industry: The Role of Accountants,
Lawyers, and Financial Professionals, 108thCong., November 18 & 20, 2003.
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involved were greedy to the point that charging commission based fees were not enough to lead
them to decrease a client's tax burden ad hoc, rather they created a product that could be mass
produced and sold to each customer, creating enormous economic benefits. Mass production is
not often a term that surfaces in the context of highly respected professional services firms.
An interesting recommendation proposed by Petersen was to create a whistleblower
provision that offers economic incentive. Anyone with knowledge of an abusive sheltering
operation could receive cash in return for disclosing valuable information to the authorities.93
This idea is on the right track since cash incentives play an enormous role with financial types.
But, one's desire to blow the whistle comes from other pressures that naturally surround illegal
activity. Allegedly Michael Hamersley spoke out because he was experiencing pressure to
participate in tax fraud, but maybe, he wanted to save his own reputation and avoid indictment.
Others speak out because they acknowledge that criminal activity is occurring and they feel it is
their moral duty to intervene. Ethical employees most likely would not be concerned with a
$5,000 or $10,000 bonus for turning in their boss when it is their duty to do so anyway.
This recommendation also draws the question of who would provide the award and
whether or not the award would be material in respect to any risks assumed by whistleblowing.
Potential risks include: losing one's job, losing friends and colleagues, damaging one's
reputation, and losing professional licenses for partial involvement in illegal activity. Surely an
economic award alone would not be great enough to influence a professional's decision to blow
the whistle.
Petersen's next recommendation serves as an extension ofthe already advantageous
practice by the courts of issuing injunctions. She proposed the requirement of licensing tax
93
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return preparers so that if preparers file abusive returns, the authorities can suspend or revoke
indefinitely their right to prepare returns.94 This recommendation is reasonable because the
practice of licensing would enable the IRS to maintain tighter control of practitioners who
exhibit the expertise to implement abusive shelters. Each practitioner could receive an
identification number that would be disclosed on each return prepared. Returns found to be
altered by abusive shelters could be traced back to the practitioner allowing the court system to
deal with the situation accordingly. The courts could decide upon a specific time period to
revoke the practitioner's right to prepare returns, much like the courts are able to revoke a
person's right to drive after traffic violations. Simple computer programs could disallow returns
prepared under revoked license numbers.
While the idea of issuing preparation licenses seems like a satisfactory alternative to cash
fines for the deterrence of fraud, Petersen introduced yet a more intriguing possibility through
the following:
Publish a list of firms that issue tax opinions that fail to properly analyze the tax consequences of
the transactions so that the public can be put on notice that they cannot rely on opinions of that
finn. The finn would remain on the list for that period of time (say one year) and would be added
and remain on the list for that period of time each time it is determined that an improper opinion
has been issued.95

This would most definitely encourage firms to issue correct advice and legal products as often as
possible in order to maintain their reputation. It is common knowledge in the financial industry
that a firm's reputation for expertise is often its most valuable asset. This might also increase
competition"between firms, resulting in cheaper and better quality service for clients. In
addition, the preparation licenses recommendation can tie together with the transparency
recommendation through the public disclosure of licenses that have been revoked in the past
94
95
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year. The same computer program that identifies and disallows specific preparers could also
periodically update a publicly accessed website by adding and removing identification numbers.
On the other hand, this type of regulation could bring a few negative effects as well.
Firms might extensively try to distance themselves from any liability resulting from their advice,
which subsequently would make their opinions less effective. They may also be more reluctant
to issue quality and beneficial advice to clients because it is complex and uncertain in the scope
of the law. Firms would have less encouragement to challenge the law on behalf oftheir clients.
An ideal solution to abusive tax sheltering will prove to be less overkill and will allow firms to
operate under less stress and provide the best service possible to clients.
Finally, one of the most promising recommendations to the U.S. Senate Permanent
Subcommittee came separately from both Debra Peterson and Calvin H. Johnson. They both
contend that the IRS has been weaker in the past compared to the mighty accounting firms who
at the time were in the business of testing the agency. Peterson stated:
A gentler, kinder Internal Revenue Service has contributed to the perception that tax professionals
can get away with just about anything because the watch dog is asleep. The IRS and other tax
enforcement agencies need more resources to audit taxpayers who engage in abusive tax
transactions.

,,96

Johnson's comments build on this statement by offering:
The alternative (to imposing extensive economic penalties) is to increase the audit rate, and to
increase the education and talent of IRS auditors and lawyers. We should be increasing the
salaries of IRS officials to match those of the private sector against whom they are competing and
we need more IRS officials. . . . Still, the government should be able to collect its auditing,
litigation and collection costs if the promotion of the opinion caused it that unnecessary expense.
A possible remedy, approaching the level required by the bad man or neutral economic theory
level, would be to collect the tax lost from the opinion writer and promoter on failed shelters, even
when the IRS collects the tax by deficiency against the client. That money would be a proxy for
all the cases that the IRS did not catch the client, but should have.97
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New control procedures are an improvement to be sure, but are they fail-safe? They can
still be circumvented by smart well-paid tax professionals. Thus, one extremely effective
solution to curbing tax abuse would be to increase penalties to the point that the risks of this type
of activity outweigh the benefits. Certain practitioners at the Big-Four firms ventured into this
risky activity based on the fact that they could charge a premium that far outweighed the
potential risk. And, had it not been for Michael Hamersley and a handful of other indicators,
these risk takers might have succeeded.
Johnson established an important point. The IRS has less talented resources to compete
with the expertise ofthe Big-Four. An increase in funding would enable them to attract more
talented individuals out of college and from the experienced workforce resulting in better quality
audits and a quicker realization of fraud. Highly talented individuals will be more able to focus
on problem areas of a return and provide better scrutiny. Due to a level playing field, shelter
promoters would not be as confident that they could disguise an abusive shelter. It is likely that
the risk to practitioners would be high enough to cancel any temptation.
Johnson also proposed a catchy way to fund the remodeling ofthe IRS, make firms who
are guilty of implementing abusive tax shelter promotions pay the amounts lost to the IRS as a
result of the promotion. Since the taxpayer also would have to pay back taxes the government
would realize additional punitive amounts equal to the intended tax savings. However, this
funding mechanism may also lie vulnerable to the overkill criticism. Again, firms might decide
that even acting as an advisor to legal tax sheltering brings too great of a risk and that it would be
best to exit the tax sheltering industry all together. As a result ofthe potential widespread
conservatism among firms, clients would lose the available quality of service that prominent
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firms have proven that they can provide, and would have to settle for second rate practitioners
who are willing to accept the risk.
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Ethics
"The bad news is that painless lessons tend not to stick.

-- Jesse

"

Eisinger

"Not only does one have to know the right thing to do - one must have the moral fortitude

to do it.
"

-- Anonymous

Role of Ethics
The first annual Ethics Day at Northern Illinoi~ University was held on October 18, 2006.
Amidst the free hot dogs and ethics handbooks was the College of Business's intent to create
awareness ofthe topic and how it will affect the lives of students, both in the classroom and
eventually on the job. Even though many rarely take the time to stop and look, ethical dilemmas,
big and small, are everywhere. The decisions to give a fellow peer insight to their upcoming
quiz, peek at a neighbor's test, take an extra half hour for lunch, and to do personal work on
company time are a few seemingly insignificant decisions compared to the decisions to pay a
peer to do homework, use a cheat sheet, routinely defer tougher assignments to coworkers, and to
lie about experience or qualifications. But, these are all decisions that people make everyday at
school or in the office and regardless of their insignificance they are all unethical choices. In
fact, most people do not even think about the ethical dilemma that any of the previous decisions
present because they are used to making routine, split-second ethical decisions. But, what
happens when the ethical dilemma is multiplied in scale?
The racecar analogy proposed by Scott Mitchell98 provides a conceptual correlation
between a racecar without brakes and a profitable corporation without an ethics framework. Just
as the goal of racecar drivers is to push their car to the limit to win races, the goal of many CEOs
is to push their company to the limit to achieve internal earnings goals or the expectations of
98

Scott Mitchell is Chairman and CEO of Open Compliance and Ethics Group.
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Wall Street. But, suppose the high performing racecar does not have brakes and the Fortune 500
company does not have an ethics framework. What happens when these two very determined
leaders approach a turn in the road? The driver risks an accident and the CEO risks undetected
fraud, both of which can be disastrous. Where getting into a racecar without brakes obviously
appears unattractive, becoming a stakeholder in a company that does not have an adequate
framework for ethics should appear equally as unattractive. Although they may have a pit crew
or a board of directors, both the racecar driver and the CEO are often times in complete control.
Just as brakes allow the driver to maneuver the car around turns, an ethics framework allows for
more control over a company and decreases the chances of unchecked and potentially fraudulent
activity during a time of growth. 99

Further, like racecar drivers, CEOs instinctively do not want to slow down and in turn
may make decisions that are not in the company's best long-term growth interest. CEOs often
times want to expand a company to the degree oftheir ego, but future problems may result from
fast, unnecessary growth. Similarly, earnings management can be an unethical practice that
some leaders are guilty of.1OOAlthough this practice sometimes has the power to meet earnings
goals, often it does not result in the true disclosure of where a company stands. Moreover,
pressure to meet earnings goals might make other leaders turn towards increasingly unethical and
potentially illegal strategies. Thus, a strong component of ethics in a company serves the
purpose of maintaining quality growth. When problems arise the company will be in a stronger
position to deal with them as opposed to in the fast paced, earnings driven growth that was
common throughout the late 1990s. In the late 90s problems grew as they went unnoticed and
99

Scott Mitchell,"Open Complianceand Ethics Group," PowerPointpresentation,October 18,2006. Northern

Illinois University College of Business, DeKalb, IL.
100Earnings management most commonly refers to management's decision to manipulate asset and liability
timetables in the current year, which then either has positive or negative effects the following year (deferring
liabilities and prematurely recording assets).
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the company continued to expand. Therefore, in the past when the ethical dilemma was
multiplied in scale it resulted in an alarming number of corporate scandal headlines. Hopefully
ethics awareness can lead to the acknowledgement by many firms that a solid core of ethics can
prevent disaster when intense ethical dilemmas present themselves, all while helping trim and
guide business.
Ethics v. Law
It is important to differentiate between morals, ethics, and law. Morals are composed of
one's values and beliefs formed over time and are the basis for ethical conduct. According to
Merriam- Webster, ethics refers to the discipline dealing with what is good and bad and with
moral duty and obligation. However, Encyclopedia Britannica describes law as referring to rules
of conduct of a community that are recognized as binding by the community and carry
enforcement through a controlling authority. Therefore, the fundamental difference between
morals or ethics and law is that law is enforced by the endorsing community. Ethics, as in what
is good and bad behavior may also be supported by the community, but unless unethical
practices coincide with law, perpetrators cannot be legally penalized. Some acts may be
considered ethical and legal or unethical and illegal, while others may be considered unethical
but legal, or ethical yet illegal. It is a person's moral beliefs that lead to assuming an illegal act
is ethical, whereas it is the intent oflaw makers and theoretically the overall sentiment of society
that determines whether an act is legal.
In addition, the topic of tax sheltering, in its many forms, fits perfectly with the various
combinations between ethics and law. Assume taxpayer A holds personal beliefs and values that
lead him or her to think that the very purpose of tax sheltering is to shield one's income from
taxes to the state, and therefore is wrong. Hence, all forms of tax sheltering are wrong, including
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the use of legal tax planning shelters endorsed by the IRS and upheld by Tax Courts. This
person then believes that all tax shelters are unethical, but also acknowledges that some are legal.
Suppose taxpayer B holds beliefs and values that lead him or her to think that the purpose
oftax sheltering is to shield one's income as intended by Congress and that it is right to take
advantage of shelters offered as incentives to act or donate in a certain fashion. Hence, taxpayer
B believes all shelters endorsed by the IRS and upheld by Tax Courts are ethical and legal. Also,
if according to taxpayer B' s values and beliefs he or she thinks it is not ok to embellish the
interpretations of Congress by taking part in potentially abusive tax shelters, then he or she
believes that abusive shelters are unethical and illegal.
Finally, taxpayer C holds beliefs and values that lead him or her to think that the purpose
oftax sheltering should be to limit a taxpayer's vulnerability to tax burden, regardless of
Congress' intentions. Therefore, taxpayer C believes that all tax shelters, including potentially
abusive shelters, are ethical on their fundamental basis to protect from tax liability. Even though
taxpayer C recognizes that there is a boundary between legal and illegal sheltering, he or she still
believes all tax shelters are ethical.
The dilemma among beliefs in line with those of taxpayer C, presents a dangerous
combination ifheld by tax practitioners among the most prominent accounting firms in the
world. By definition a person's beliefs can not be wrong, and therefore taxpayer C can not be
sanctioned for thinking in such a manner. Nevertheless, this is precisely where law comes into
focus. The law clearly states that taxpayers can hold any array of beliefs, views, morals, and
complaints over the tax system, as long as they pay their legal tax liability. Legal enforcement of
tax laws is the answer to taxpayer C's beliefs. There is no telling what specific views on the tax
system many of those involved in creating, marketing, and implementing abusive tax shelters
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had in the past or will have in the future. But, one thing remains clear, the ethical dilemma
presented to those professionals was too great for their own set of morals to establish the
necessary ethical guidelines, and instead the law imposed a different boundary.
AICPA Code of Professional Conduct
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants is the largest professional
organization ofCPAs in the United States and primarily serves as a self-regulator of the
profession. Professional standards of conduct set by the AICPA are applicable to accountants of
all disciplines as according to the following statement published on the AICP A website, "The
AICPA Code of Professional Conduct was adopted by the membership to provide guidance and
rules to all members-those

in public practice, in industry, in government, and in education-in

the performance oftheir professional responsibilities.,,101 Further, the AICP A discuses some
principles of professional conduct:
The Code of Professional Conduct provides general guidance on professional responsibilities, the
public interest, integrity, objectivity and independence, due care, and the scope and nature of
services without establishing specific standards. Nevertheless, they should be read by every
practitioner. An understanding of the difference between independence and objectivity is
important particularly when consulting services are being provided to attest service clients. The
AICPA standards for independence relate only to the performance of attestation services. The
standards for objectivity apply to all services. It is important, however, that the practitioner adhere
to all the rules that are appropriate for the particular service being provided. 102

The Code of Professional Conduct establishes five main areas of guidance: Section 100Independence, Integrity, and Objectivity; Section 200 - General Standards Accounting
Principles; Section 300 - Responsibilities to Clients; Section 400 - Responsibilities to
Colleagues; and Section 500 - Other Responsibilities
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Conduct," AICPA web

Relevant to abusive sheltering is Section 300 of the Code of Professional Conduct
discussing responsibilities to clients and specifically, contingent and excessive fees. As already
established, certain tax practitioners were charging "value added" fees that were only collected if
a client was able to take advantage of the marketed tax results and secure a certain amount oftax
savings. AICP A rule 302 states:
.01 Rule 302-Contingent fees.
A member in public practice shall not
2) Prepare an original or amended tax return or claim for a tax refund for a contingent
fee for any client.
Interpretation under Rule 302
-Contingent Fees
.02 302-I-Contingent fees in tax matters.
This interpretation defmes certain terms in rule 302 and provides examples of the application of
the rule.
Definition of Terms
(a) Preparation of an original or amended tax return or claim for tax refund includes
giving advice on events which have occurred at the time the advice is given if such
advice is directly relevant to determining the existence, character, or amount of a
schedule, entry, or other portion of a return or claim for refund.
(b) A fee is considered determined based on the findings of governmental agencies if
the member can demonstrate a reasonable expectation, at the time of a fee arrangement,
of substantive consideration by an agency with respect to the member's client. Such an
expectation is deemed not reasonable in the case of preparation of original tax returns. 104

Therefore, the efforts of certain tax professionals to charge fees contingent upon tax
savings is highly unethical. Implications resulting ITomcharging contingent fees include
excessive marketing and implementation oftax shelters that at the time were viewed as
borderline legal, but in hindsight are now known to be illegal. Contingency fees are unethical
because they take away ITomthe true task at hand, which is to provide the highest quality advice
and service to the client. However, when the possibility exists to cash in on lucrative
contingency fees the temptation also exists to offer advice that plainly maximizes profit
potential.

104
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- 55-

-

Contingent Fees ," AICP A web site,

Moreover, unethical contingency fees allegedly shifted hands when certain KPMG
professionals screened for potential shelter clients. The professionals in question promised to
pay a fee to their sources for every client who actually purchased a tax product. Many times
sources of potentail clients were investment banks where KPMG served as the SEC registered
independent auditing firm. According to the Minority Staff report, the following was found in an
email from Tom Newman, a First Union employee, to multiple other First Union employees,
"Fees to First Union will be 50 basis points ifthe investor is not a KPMG client, and 25 bps if
they are a KPMG client.,,105 In this case First Union was one investment bank that took part in
the contingency compensation plan created by the involved tax practitioners. Although it is
unclear exactly how much economic compensation correlates with basis points, there was a
clearly outlined compensation system acting as incentive for the involved investment banks to
refer clients to the sheltering services.
Many believe utilizing this type of method to attract clientele effectively cheapens the
profession much in the same way as purchasing another firm's contact list or cold calling. As a
result, the profession of accounting has outlawed the practice. Still, there is an important
distinction to be made. Standards set by the AICP A are professional standards and in some cases
rise above legal standards imposed by the SEC or the PCAOB106. Thus, some conduct that is
frowned upon by the AICP A may be legal. For example, it is common in the marketing function
to circulate customer contact information for compensation.
Moreover, Just because professional organizations and fellow colleagues declare an act
unethical does not mean legal sanctions can be imposed, except when the unethical act aligns

105
United States Senate Connnittee on Governmental Affairs, US Tax Shelter Industry: The Role of Accountants,
Lawyers, and Financial Professionals, 108tb Cong., November 18 & 20,2003.
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The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board was created by the Sarbanes-Oxley act of 2002 and carries the
responsibility of overseeing audits of public companies in order to protect the interests of stakeholders.
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with the law. During the late 90s and first few years ofthe new millenium there might not have
been laws prohibiting contingency fees in the accounting profession. Generally the extent of
power of the AICPA is to suspend indefinately a member's license and to publicly display the
suspension online, whereas the SEC and PCAOB are full legal arms of the United States
Government that have authority to facilitate law suites against those who cross legal boundaries.
Also relevant to the KPMG scandal is Section 100 of the Professional Code of Conduct
targeting independence. As established, certain practitioners at KPMG worked with numerous
investment banks, who were also SEC audit clients, during the orchestration of many abusive
shelters. The Code of Professional Conduct states:
ET Section 100.01 - Conceptual Framework for AICPA Independence Standards .06
Independence is defined as:
a. Independence of mind-The state of mind that permits the performance of an attest
service without being affected by influences that compromise professional judgment,
thereby allowing an individual to act with integrity and exercise objectivity and
professional skepticism.
b. Independence in appearance-The avoidance of circumstances that would cause a
reasonable and informed third party, having knowledge of all relevant information,
including safeguards iii2 applied, to reasonably conclude that the integrity, objectivity, or
professional sk~ticism of a firm or a member of the attest engagement team had been
compromised. 10

Independence of mind and independence in appearance were both at risk during the abusive
sheltering period. By recruiting SEC audit clients to provide the investment banking function of
the transactions in the shelters, those involved at KPMG had established a basic partnership with
those banks. The banks took part by processing hundreds of separate transactions for different
clients in conjuction with KPMG practitioners who orchestrated the shelters. Both the AICP A
and the SEC established that there cannot be independence between un-official partnerships with
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The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, "ET Section 100.01 - Conceptual Framework for
AICPA Independence Standards," AICPA web site, http://www.aicpa.org/about/code/et_100.html, accessed October
2006.
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the following, "The SEC considers independence to be impaired when the firm has a direct or
material indirect business relationship with an SEC audit client.,,108
Sarbanes-Oxley
The fairly recent unraveling of numerous corporate scandals prompted Congress to create
Sarbanes-Oxley, which is considered the most sweeping piece of financial litigation since the 33
and 34 acts. 109The fostering of a corporate environment or principal-agent relationship that
allows for gross information asymmetry between officers and stakeholders provides for rampant
corporate scandal. Although it is illegal under SEC regulations to plainly fabricate optimal
assertions to stakeholders, Sarbanes-Oxley increased the responsibility, on behalf of CEOs and
CFOs, for representational and transparent financial reporting. Under Sarbanes-Oxley CEOs
now have to sign off on the financial statements, asserting that the statements are correct.
Subsequently, the law enforces fines and jail time for the highly unethical and illegal abuse of
managerial position, stemming from the principal-agent relationship. Sarbanes-Oxley is aimed
at decreasing the disparity of knowledge-based power between management and stakeholders by
designating legal responsibility of assertions to officers and the board of directors.
Further, the extensive complexity of tax law made the KPMG scandal difficult to render
as illegal. The act of decreasing the tax liability of a client for the sake of not paying taxes is
unethical by taking advantage ofthe tax system and client's responsibility to state. Wealthy
individuals and select corporations were circumventing their own tax liability, thus shifting the
tax burden to the remainder of society. In other words, taxpayers involved were not paying-in
their fair share. Recall that loopholes sometimes allow breaks in tax and unless investigators can
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prove that certain professionals incorrectly exploited a loophole, they would not be able to
prosecute those persons according to legal penalties. After investigation it is likely that a handful
ofKPMG tax professionals, among many in the tax community, were profiting off of the very
unethical and illegal practice of abusive tax sheltering.
Prior to Sarbanes-Oxley, Rule 50 I of the Professional Code of Conduct had clearly
established that employee harassment was unethical. The code states:
50 1-2-Discrimination and harassment in employment practices.
Whenever a member is finally determined by a court of competent jurisdiction to have violated
any of the antidiscrimination laws of the United States or any state or municipality thereof,
including those related to sexual and other forms of harassment, or has waived or lost his/her right
of appeal after a hearing by an administrative agency, the member will be presumed to have
committed an act discreditable to the profession in violation of rule 501.110

Sarbanes-Oxley merely broadened the scope ofthis unethical practice to make such behavior
applicable to legal sanctions. Sarbanes-Oxley enacted the following whistleblower provisions:
Sec. 1514A. Civil action to protect against retaliation in tfaud cases
(a) WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION FOR EMPLOYEES OF PUBLICLY TRADED
COMP ANIES- No company with a class of securities registered under section 12 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (IS U.S.C. 781), or that is required to fIle reports under section 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (IS U.S.c. 78o(d», or any officer, employee, contractor,
subcontractor, or agent of such company, may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, or in
any other manner discriminate against an employee in the terms and conditions of employment
because of any lawful act done by the employee-(1) to provide information, cause information to be provided, or otherwise assist in an
investigation regarding any conduct which the employee reasonably believes constitutes a
violation of section 1341, 1343, 1344, or 1348, any rule or regulation of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, or any provision of Federal law relating to tfaud against
shareholders, when the information or assistance is provided to or the investigation is
conducted by-(A) a Federal regulatory or law enforcement agency;
(B) any Member of Congress or any committee of Congress; or
(C) a person with supervisory authority over the employee (or such other person
working for the employer who has the authority to investigate, discover, or
terminate misconduct); or
(2) to fIle, cause to be fIled, testify, participate in, or otherwise assist in a proceeding filed
or about to be filed (with any knowledge of the employer) relating to an alleged violation of
section 1341, 1343, 1344, or 1348, any rule or regulation of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, or any provision of Federal law relating to tfaud against shareholders.l1l
110
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Circular 230
Where the AICPA Code of Professional Conduct is applicable to all practicing
accountants, the Department of Treasury created Circular 230 as a code of conduct targeting tax
practitioners. Moreover, Circular 230 tries to ensure that tax opinions and tax advice is correct
and has been put through the appropriate due diligence before being passed on to taxpayers.
Overall, Circular 230 sets up professional standards to govern practitioners who wish to practice
before the IRS. All tax practitioners must adhere to these standards, according to law. Similar to
the AICPA's Code of Professional Conduct, Circular 230 includes ethical and professional
responsibility rules that every professional should take into account because they are a consensus
of standards among tax professionals.112 This meaning that since Circular 230 sets a good
example for tax practitioners, professionals in different functions can still benefit from the
principles it provides.
Relevant to abusive tax sheltering, Circular 230 underwent revision by the Department of
Treasury on December 17,2004, which strengthened and clarified many aspects ofthe
document. The IRS released the following in conjunction:
WASHINGTON - As part of an ongoing effort to improve ethical standards for tax professionals
and to curb abusive tax avoidance transactions, the Treasury Department and the Internal Revenue
Service today issued final regulations amending Treasury Department Circular 230.
Circular 230 is applicable to attorneys, accountants and other tax professionals who practice
before the IRS. The revisions to Circular 230 provide standards of practice for written advice that
reflect current best practices and are intended to restore and maintain public confidence in tax
professionals. These revisions ensure that tax professionals do not provide inadequate advice, and
increase transparency by requiring tax professionals to make disclosures if the advice is
incomplete.

113
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York, NY, November 1,2005.
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Also, the IRS intends not to impose sanctions lightly or without merit. But, where practitioners
have acted reckless in failure to comply with Circular 230 the IRS plans to hold them
accountable.

I14

In the past, the guidelines of Circular 230 have been relatively vague. Now, in response
to the need expressed by abusive sheltering, the revision to Circular 230 creates clearly spelled
out guidelines. For example, steps have been taken to reveal the completeness of due diligence
when writing an opinion. These clearly defined steps intend to facilitate opinions that taxpayers
can rely on. Accordingly, sanctions for not following these steps include revocation of a
practitioner's right to practice before the IRS.IIS
Generally, practitioners have responded positively to the increased guidelines. According
to Harvey Coustan, a retired CPA from Ernst & Young, many practitioners have published lists
of best practices under Circular 230 as reference material for their firm. Others have published
required steps in forming a covered opinion, and the steps necessary when only issuing advice.116
However, some practitioners have reacted negatively to the additional Circular 230
requirements. Their argument follows the "If it ain't broke, don't fix it" theory and contends that
some of the new requirements are unnecessary.
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accessed

Some claim that the new requirements change the way they do business and how they
interact with their clients, while others claim that their clients were perfectly happy with their
work before the revision. I17 Complaints against Circular 230 parallel those of Sarbanes-Oxley,

asserting that this legislation is ahead of its time and somewhat overkill to the situation at hand.
However, only time will tell as to the effectiveness and applicability of this new legislation to
future ethical and fraudulent issues.
Interestingly enough the AICPA has made it clear that they hold a negative stance on the
Department of Treasury's amendment to Circular 230. In a letter addressed to the Honorable
Mark Everson, the AICPA outlined several concerns over ~henew amendment. The following
illustrates the AICPA's concern:
While the AICP A supports the goals of the Treasury and IRS in revising practitioner standards,
the proposed changes in REG 122380-02 raise some general concerns that we believe are held by
a large segment of the practitioner community. Unfortunately, many of the proposed Circular 230
revisions appear to reflect a lack of balance that may undercut both the goal of enhanced standards
and compromise fundamental fairness. The proposed regulations also create additional grounds for
sanction without any explanation of why the additional provisions are necessary or when they
might be satisfied in a particular case. The net effect of these changes, if adopted without
elaboration or examples, unfortunately may be to unnecessarily subject practitioners to discipline
and sanction. Our attached comments detail our concerns and recommendations on these and other
issues. I18

The most significant concern of the AICPA and many others in the tax community is the
wrongful or unnecessary subjection of small firm tax practitioners to new sanctions. Although
the larger accounting firms may have the resources to change their practices in a relatively short
period of time, smaller partnerships may be adversely affected when trying to conform to new
standards. Alan Einhorn, a CPA from Deloitte & Touche, offered the following concern relating
117Alan Einhorn, "The Practitioner's Take on Circular 230," The American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, Inc., New York, NY, November 1,2005.,
http://tax.aicpa.org/UI/ _ASPXJLoginiSendUserToExternaISite.aspx?URL=mms%3a%2fOIo2fsw_nyc
006.media.globix.net%2faicpa%2ITax+Reform+ConfOIo2fEinhorn+%26amp%3b+Schrieber _hi. wmv&siteCode=O,
accessed October 2006.
118
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to the new amendment, "It doesn't matter what size practitioner there is they need to understand
these rules and the firm has to have the process and procedures in place to indicate that they are
trying their best to comply with these rules.,,119 Einhorn was referring to the inadequacies or
lack of awareness, present at certain small accounting firms, of the need to conform to the new
standards. For example, section 10.37 of Circular 230 applies to all tax practitioners and all
written tax advice they offer. The AICPA's remedy to this concern is to publish extensive
resources on their website including slide shows, memos, and practice aides, etc.
The general sentiment of the IRS opposes the concerns of the AICPA. Stephen Whitlock
of the IRS contends that if tax practitioners have been issuing independent, competent, and
diligent advice in the past then Circular 230 only introduces a new format for issuing such
advice.12o Hence, ifthe new Circular 230 guidelines are too great of a burden, then practitioners
need to assert more due diligence and re-visit and re-assess their approach to tax issues. In turn,
the answers issued to clients need to be revised. 121

Open Compliance & Ethics Group (OCEG)
As referenced earlier, Scott L. Mitchell, CEO of Open Compliance & Ethics Group, gave
a presentation to Northern Illinois University College of Business students and faculty on the
first annual Ethics Day in Barsema Auditorium. His presentation was awareness based and
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discussed the importance of establishing an ethical framework in any given organization. The
purpose of his presentation was to describe what the non-profit organization does.
OCEG's mission is to help organizations align their governance, compliance, and risk
management activities to drive business performance and promote integrity. 122 To do this they
provide a framework for clients to think about, which is an ethics model similar in principle to a
business model. Termed GRC+C for governance, risk management, compliance, and culture, the
framework is a process to track and identify risks that lead to crossing boundaries while creating
and maintaining a solid culture in a belief initiative. Presumably GRC+C is a new business fad
much like ERP, JIT, or Six Sigma.
The OCEG website defines each component of GRC+C. First, Governance sets and
evaluates performance against objectives. Governance also includes the power to authorize
business strategies and models to achieve objectives. Secondly, Risk Management proactively
identifies and rigorously assesses and addresses potential obstacles to achieving objectives. Risk
Management also identifies and addresses risks that lead the organization to step outside of
mandated and voluntary boundaries. Next, Compliance proactively encourages and requires
compliance with established policies and detects noncompliance and responds accordingly.
Finally, Culture establishes an organizational climate and mind-sets of individuals that promote
ethical behavior, trust, integrity, and accountability. 123

There is a clear need for such consulting that OCEG provides since business models do
not always coincide with desirable ethics models. For example, assume XYZ Company, a
chemical manufacturer, currently operates towards the objective of producing chemical A at the
cheapest price. In addition, assume that the consequences of breaking applicable pollution laws
122Open Compliance and .Ethics Group, "Mission Statement,"
accessed October 2006.
123
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OCEG web site, http://www.oceg.orglMission.aspx,

are less than the benefits of complying with them. XYZ Company's business model operates
only with mandated legal boundaries, pollution laws for example. After consulting with OCEG,
XYZ company would be likely to implement additional voluntary boundaries in response to
harmful pollution output levels. In the long run this ethical strategy is likely to preserve the
chemical company by establishing forward looking goals that will be less negatively affected by
adversely shifting mandated boundaries. In the future when pollution laws become more
stringent, XYZ will be in a better position than competitors to deal with the tougher laws.
Moreover, as mentioned earlier, scandal is perpetrated by an individual, not a company as
a whole. This important distinction offers another internally based reason why corporations
should establish an ethical framework. Structured and methodical companies are more likely to
catch ethical breaches by a handful of fraud perpetrators than a company that has no
straightforward set of guidelines to ensure proper compliance with applicable laws and codes of
conduct. It can be exponentially damaging to a company the longer unethical or fraudulent
practices go unnoticed. Worst case scenarios need no introduction, Enron, WorldCom, and
Arthur Anderson. But, consider breaches of ethics at firms that still have a going concern.
KPMG, PWC, and E&Y, as a result ofthe actions of a few, have been withstanding the
worldwide embarrassment oftax scandals that were perpetrated by a very select group. Even
though 99.9%,ofthe remaining employees at these global firms had no part in the incident, they
are, nonetheless, connected with the wrongdoing of a few.
Touching on a previous analogy, an ethics framework acts as a tool to control growth and
better guide a company. When things go slightly wrong the company is able to catch the
mistakes in a timely manner. Without the control that an ethics framework provides, mistakes
will amplify and cause exponential damage. OCEG is working towards implementing a culture
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where their clients are protective against fraud. But also, when fraud does occur, their clients
will be better prepared to deal with it.
Deloitte & Touche serves as an example of a finn that has been changing their culture
from top down. Recently the U.S. member finns have been making tremendous efforts to
diversify their employees. On July 14, 2006 Barry Salzberg, Managing Partner ofDeloitte
America, gave a speech to roughly 500 college students at the closing ceremony of their Deloitte
National leadership Conference discussing their women's initiative and general importance of
diversity.124 This initiative most likely was not based on strengthening ethics and deterring
fraud, but was probably based on projecting a politically correct image. In the professional
services industry it is becoming increasingly important to maintain a quality image. As such,
Deloitte believes that it is important for their employees and consultants to "look" like their
clients.125 As the market becomes more diverse, Deloitte attempts to become more diverse.
Nevertheless, the diversity initiative likely has had a positive impact on the deterrence of
ethical breaches and ultimately fraud. As seen with KPMG, PwC, and E&Y a culture was
created by a small group of professionals, who presumably thought alike and came from
strikingly similar backgrounds, where it was ok for certain tax groups to manipulate the
intentions of Congress. Deloitte's diversity initiative attempts to create a situation where
everyone in the room has different capabilities and comes from differing backgrounds and as a
result, coincidentally fonns functional groups that may react strongly to an array of motivational
sources instead of a single source. Where a handful of tax practitioners at other Big-Four and
Mid-Tier accounting finns were heavily swayed by contingency fees and exorbitant wages, it

124
Barry Salzberg, Managing Partner ofDeloitte & Touche USA LLP, "Deloitte National Leadership Conference
2006 Closing Ceremony Speech," July 14,2006. Scottsdale Resort and Conference Center, Scottsdale, AZ.
125
Peter Kaplan, Internal Audit Manager, Deloitte & Touche USA LLP. Interview by author. Chicago, IL, October
27,2006.

- 66-

may be more likely that at Deloitte half of the group would not be as inclined to accept unethical
practices based on a single type of motivation. To clarify, this is not to say that professionals
from certain backgrounds and ethnicities are invincible to perpetrating fraud, rather additional
types of motivation, other than economical, would have to be present to sway a diverse group to
unethical and fraudulent practices.
The diversity initiative represents a partial solution to preventing fraud. Previous
portions of this paper discussed the frequent response to fraud of developing and implementing
additional review processes or partially independent review processes that are eerily similar to
control processes already in place. The true answer is to think outside of the box and create
change in areas other than hard process controls. Areas such as ethics awareness and culture also
playa role in determining how prone a firm is to fraud. In the context of the fraud triangle,
process controls only work to reduce opportunity, whereas a diversity initiative may work to
reduce motivation. It is by thinking in other than a strictly control based mindset that a firm will
realize other potential weaknesses. Process controls will always have a fundamental weakness
illustrated by the saying, "rules were meant to be broken." Talented, resourceful, and motivated
individuals will find a way to circumvent process controls. Therefore, Deloitte's diversity
initiative may have inadvertently insulated the firm from one-third of the fraud triangle, thus
effectively eliminating the firm's participation in the industry's latest scandals. When was the
last time you heard Deloitte's name mentioned in connection with a breach in ethics,
misrepresentation, or fraud?
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Three Relevant Codes of Ethics
I

Code of Ethics of the National Association of Tax Consultants
Each member shall conduct himself according to the highest standard by:

II

·

Obeying all laws governing the practice of tax preparation as regulated by the legislative bodies of the
member's state and the federal government;

·

Maintaining the highest standards of honesty, integrity and confidentiality in all relationships with
clients, keeping as the utmost concerns the client's best interest;

·

Treating statutory educational requirements as the minimum, while maintaining current knowledge in
all areas of a member's practice;

·

Extending professional courtesies to all colleagues in the tax preparation field while maintaining
respect for a colleague's practice and area of specialty; and

·

Working to further the goals of the National Association of Tax Consultants by setting the example for
professional standards and working to improve education throughout the tax profession.

·

Further, each NATC member understands that if enjoined from practice or convicted of a felony,
membership in NATC will be suspended, pending review of the proper NATC committee. 126

Subsection of the KPMG Global Code of Conduct: MANAGEMENT RESPONSmILITlES
It is of particular importance that those with management responsibilities lead by example and act with
integrity, making ethical behavior a cornerstone of conduct at KPMG. If you lead or manage others you
should:
Be a positive role model by showing what it means to act with integrity.

·
·

Ensure that others have the knowledge and resources they need to adhere to KPMG's standards.

·

Set clear, measurable, and challenging goals that promote ethical behavior.

·

Enforce KPMG's standards consistently and fairly, and promote compliance with those you lead.

·

Respond appropriately to those who raise questions and concerns in good faith.

·

Be prepared to be held personally accountable for your own integrity shortcomings as well as those of
the people you lead. 127
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III

Northern Illinois University College of Business Student Code of Ethics
As a student at Northern Illinois University's College of Business, I understand that it is my duty to behave
in a courteous and ethical manner at all times. The attitudes and habits I develop as a student form the core
of my professional behavior. As such, I will set an example of the highest caliber for those that work with
me.
To promote these behaviors within the student body, I will use the principles of honesty, respect, integrity,
and professionalism as my academic and professional guide.
HONESTY:

·

Understand the College's policies on academic conduct, and practice them as part of my life

·

Honor my personalobligationto be sincereand forthrightby dealingfairly and truthfullywith others

RESPECT:

·

Embrace the diverse perspectives and accomplishments of others, knowing that it is the personal and
cultural variations among people that enrich us individually and as a society

·

Take pride in my College and University by protecting our facilities and their surroundings

INTEGRITY:

·

Maintain my beliefs and values despite changing circumstances and challenging environments

·

Respect my reputation and that of my university by avoiding unethical behaviors and the circumstances
encourage them

that

PROFESSIONALISM:
·

Maintain the highest standards of performance, conduct, and cooperation with my fellow students, faculty,
and co-workers

·

Perform my duties with due diligence and make a continuous effort towards improvement128
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